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The EU Emissions Trading System is a common EU-wide market for emission allowances, 
in which the companies of all Member States can participate and where the cost of green-
house gas emissions for those companies is determined. There are, however, no common 
rules as regards to the treatment of emission allowances in direct taxation. This can poten-
tially create the following types of problems: 
 
1. Non-neutral or non-consistent tax treatment could affect the efficiency of the trading 
scheme. This would make the achievement of emission reduction targets more costly than 
otherwise would be the case. 
 
2. The differential tax treatment could also open up opportunities for tax planning and arbi-
trage and give rise to new distortions in the Internal Market as well as tax losses for Member 
States. Bearing in mind the extremely high mobility of allowances, with trade not dependent 
on the physical transfer of any goods but only a shift of allowances between accounts in the 
electronic register, this could potentially be a serious issue. 
 
3. The OECD Model Tax Convention does not currently deal explicitly with tradable per-
mits (or emission allowances), and therefore the treatment of income derived from trading of 
allowances in bilateral tax treaties depends on their treatment in domestic law of tax jurisdic-
tions. In this regard, the practices may vary between the countries as several possible inter-
pretations exist. Inconsistencies in domestic law treatment could actually lead to failure in 
relieving double taxation, which would increase the costs to market participants.  
 
The possibility of purchasing or creating emission credits from CDM and JI projects and the 
future linking of the EU ETS with other regional/national cap-and-trade schemes could fur-
ther exacerbate the problems of inconsistent tax treatment in cross-border situations. 
 
In order to cope with potential inexpediencies in EU tax treatment of allowances, we have 
accomplished the following four tasks in this study: 
 
  Analyse and identify the features of a tax system serving cost-effective implementa-
tion of the ETS system and underpin the proper workings of the Internal Market 
  Collect information and data on current national practices for countries involved in 
the EU ETS system and countries outside Europe with similar cap-and-trade sys-
tems 
  Analyse and identify significant problems with current practices 
  Provide possible policy responses and solutions to identified problems 
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The whole rationale for the EU implementing flexible, tradable mechanisms is to reduce the 
abatement costs of achieving the set reductions in greenhouse gasses by exposing enterprises 
throughout the EU covered by these mechanisms to the same marginal costs of emitting 
greenhouse gasses. EU’s system for internal trading with greenhouse gasses between enter-
prises in the EU – the Emission Trading System or ETS in the following – provides ideally 
the same monetary benefits for nearly all firms in power generation and large energy inten-
sive firms, when they reduce greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), mainly CO2.  Countries 
with binding targets for reducing GHG – so-called annex 1 countries under the Kyoto Pro-
tocol – can also reduce overall compliance costs by trading reductions.  Finally, enterprises 
covered by the scheme can choose to finance abatement activity outside the EU – for exam-
ple through Clean Development Mechanisms or CDM in the following – which can provide 
benefits to both EU and the relevant country. Given much less stringent climate policies in 
these countries, the expectation is that the costs of abatements in such projects are lower 
than internal abatement inside the EU.  
 
The success criteria for the taxation regime for taxing these two key flexible instruments are 
then that they underpin the principle of cost-effectiveness, including proper functioning of 
the internal market. The two most basic requirements are: 
 
  Tax systems should not influence where abatement takes place: if post tax costs of 
purchasing CO2 allowances were systematically lower in France than in Germany 
because taxation of ETS allowances was more beneficial in the former country, we 
would see purely tax induced shift of CO2 abatement from France to Germany. 
  Differences in tax systems between countries should not give rise to unnecessary 
compliance costs for firms and authorities or opportunities for tax arbitrage. 
 
1.1.  BEST PRACTICE TAXATION REGIMES FOR ETS: FOUR KEY QUESTIONS 
We define and answer four questions that are crucial when reviewing the functioning of tax 
systems vis-à-vis ETS and put forward our recommendations for best practice. 
 
First, should allowances be categorised in national tax systems as (1) a commodity, (2) an in-
tangible asset or (3) a financial asset, this being the three standard possible options? We gen-
erally argue that treating allowances as a commodity is the most natural solution and creates 
the least problems of implementation (see also below). Essentially, the purpose of these flexi-
ble instruments is to create a new trade ‘commodity’, namely emissions of GHG, with a 
common price inside the EU, which is to be treated as any other operational expense.  
 
Second, should firms be allowed to deduct their purchase costs for tax purpose (1) in the 
year when it is purchased or (2) when it is used to comply with ETS obligations? We argue 
that the best solution would be to deduct it when it is used. If the allowance is bought and 
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used within the same tax year, the distinction makes no difference. However, ETS allow-
ances can be stored: if not used in year one, they can be transferred for use in the subsequent 
years. Inherently, ETS allowances are not exposed to ‘wear and tear’, hence there are no costs 
associated with buying an allowance used for future compliance (besides financing costs plus 
risk of price changes). Indeed, this is a main argument against treating it as an intangible as-
set, an asset type that is typically allowed a linear depreciation of its value over its life time.  
 
Third, should capital gains and losses on allowances be taxed when (1) realised or (2) when 
they accrue? Our verdict is more open here. Most analyses on tax systems are favourable to 
accrual based taxation as deferred taxation typically increases risk of non-compliance and tax 
arbitrage.  Standard  arguments  against  this  are  adverse  cash-flow  consequences  for  firms 
(taxes have to be paid despite no incoming cash from sale) and uncertainty about the real 
market price of the asset/commodity. While the latter argument clearly does not apply to 
ETS allowances that are traded on a real-time basis, the cash-flow problem could be an issue. 
Moreover, the tax systems in place in EU uniformly use realisation principles for sales of 
other  operational  assets  and  commodities,  so  we  would  also  propose  this  principle here 
(more details about the treatment of financial firms etc. in chapter 3.2). 
 
Fourth, how should free allowances be taxed? Our focus is on the post 2012 regime where 
the allocation of free allowances are increasingly being restricted to energy intensive indus-
tries in international competition, i.e. the enterprises that are most likely to react to tax in-
duced distortions by the ETS. There are essentially two options on the table here: (1) the 
free allowances are taxed when received and deducted for tax purposes when used or (2) un-
taxed when received but also no right of deduction when used. If the free allowances are re-
ceived and used in same fiscal tax year, there is no difference from a cash-flow perspective. 
However, if the allowance is stored for use in later years, the non-tax system is preferential 
for the receiving companies as there is no up-front taxation. Again, referring to the previous 
section, we argue in favour of accrual based taxation, but suggest that uniformity of treat-
ment across EU is the most important question. 
 
Summing up best practice, we would recommend the following: 
 
  Treatment of allowances: commodity 
  Depreciation: none should be allowed (no ‘wear and tear’) 
  Time of deduction for auctioned allowances: when used 
  Taxation of gains/losses: for consistency with rest of tax system, realisation 
  Free allowances: more open question but preference for solution ‘not taxed when 
received, no later deduction when used’ 
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1.2.  TAX TREATMENT OF CREDITS ORIGINATING FROM CDM OR JI PROJECTS 
GHG abatement projects completed outside the EU can generate credits, each of which 
represents 1 tonne of greenhouse gas emissions as do EU allowances.  There is a cap on how 
many additional credits that can be used for compliance in the EU ETS, but that is not the 
issue here. Rather, it is whether the taxation of the economic activities  (also taking the use 
of ETS allowances for compliance into account) distorts the balance between competing 
CDM projects or the overall pricing of CDM projects.  
 
There are three basic options for taxing projects in the process: (1) allow deductions for ex-
penditure against realised gains as they materialise; (2) tax gross value of credit when sold, 
and (3) treat expenditures as investments and deduct against gross value of credit when sold. 
We would argue that project expenditure should be treated as an investment with no on-
going deductions. A firm buying a new and less energy consuming power plant cannot de-
duct the entire purchase costs at the point of acquiring the assets, but will activate the assets 
on its balance sheet and depreciate the costs over its lifetime. That calls for a model with ac-
tivation and taxation on realised gains in line with our recommendation for ETS allowances. 
 
However, the real underlying tax issues are much more difficult to deal with than for ETS 
allowances.  First,  the  final  purchasers  of  CDM  credits  (Certified  Emission  Reductions, 
CERs) or JI credits (Emission Reduction Units, ERUs), i.e. firms with compliance require-
ments under the ETS system, often organise their purchases through financial investments in 
‘trusts’ that subsequently are more directly involved in the process of generating the credits. 
That almost by definition implies that there will be no up-front deductions available in the 
EU as there is no expenditure related to a specific operational action.  
 
Second, the actual tax treatment of such activities will ultimately be depending on the tax 
law in the jurisdiction, in which the activities take place (China, India, Brazil etc), i.e. not in 
the remit of EU taxation.  As a point of departure, the underlying abatement project is likely 
to be embodied largely within an existing firm in the host country. That means that all salary 
costs as well as capital expenditures through depreciation schedules will be deducted against 
the firm’s overall tax bill as the project proceeds and that income from credits generated and 
sold is taxed as it is received. 
 
Third, there is considerable uncertainty about the true value of the project up to its comple-
tion, creating the possibility of some difficulties to control tax arbitrage.  If projects are sold 
between related parties, there may be an interest in selling a project to a firm in a low tax en-
vironment with a too low price and sell it from that tax environment once the project is fi-
nally realised at or close to the market price of an ETS allowance. 
   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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1.3.  POTENTIAL DISTORTIONS RESULTING FROM MEMBER STATE PRACTICE 
The general and important point is that often no clear and explicit tax rules have been 
adopted while case law also remains limited within the EU. So, the summary below is based 
upon best estimates of current assumed practice in Member States based upon a new survey 
commissioned for this study. 
 
 Of the 27 EU countries, 21 treat allowances de facto as a commodity, i.e., with either im-
mediate or time-of-use deduction, cf. Table 1.1. Of these 21 countries, 9 allow for immedi-
ate deduction of the purchase price for tax purposes, while 12 only allow deduction when ac-
tually used for compliance purposes. Five countries treat allowances as an intangible asset 
and allow firms to depreciate the assets over their expected life time (set to between 6 and 10 
years). One country (Portugal) does not allow any deduction. As regards free allowances, a 
large majority of countries (24) do not tax them when received, but do also not allow a tax 
reduction when used. Only 3 countries tax allowances as grants when received. In practice, 
this implies taxation of the excess of free allowances received against allowances used for 
compliance. National tax treatment are summarized below, cf. Table 1.1. 
 
Table 1.1 Tax treatment of allowances in EU Member States  
Issue    Treatment   
Treatment of allowance  Commodity  Intangible asset 
Time of deduction  Immediate  When used  Depreciation allowed 
Countries  BE, DE, FR, GR, IE, LU, NL,   DK, GB, IT, SE, PL, CY, CZ, SK,  AT, ES, FI, HU, BG 
  MT, EE  SI, LT, LV, RO   
Taxation of free allowances  Taxed when received  Not taxed 
Countries  ES, GB, GR  AT, BE, BG, CZ, CY, DE, DK, EE, FI, FR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, 
    MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SK, SI  
Note: Some countries seemingly allow different treatment of allowances. When this is the case, we select the treat-
ment that is most favourable from a net present value perspective. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics based on Deloitte study. 
 
The question is whether these differences in tax treatments cause distortions in the function-
ing of the ETS. 
 
For allowances received/bought in the year when they are used for compliance, the differ-
ences in tax treatment make no difference on the cash flow of firms. Hence, the tax treat-
ment is irrelevant for the actual costs of purchasing allowances and does not impact on the 
relative costs for firms across Member States.  
 
The tax treatment only matters when allowances are kept beyond one compliance/fiscal year. 
The effects of such different treatment can be measured by the Net Present Value (NPV) 
concept: how much is it worth for the firm in a country to be allowed linear depreciation of 
purchase costs up until the allowance is used for compliance, rather than just being allowed 
to deduct it when used? The same logic can be applied to other features that affect the tim-
ing of tax effects. Essentially, the NPV depends on the discount rate, the number of years be-
tween purchase and use for compliance (or sale of purchased allowances) and the company   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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tax rate. The effects on the NPV increase with the size of the discount rate (large benefit of 
upfront cash flows), the holding period (many years with depreciation of allowances) and the 
level of company tax rate. 
 
Our general conclusion is that such NPV effects are small. There are four main reasons. 
 
First, the effects per allowance are very limited. If we take an example, where a purchased al-
lowance is kept for 8 years and we use a high discount rate of 10 per cent, then the NPV ad-
vantage of immediate deduction relative to time-of-use deduction is app. 8 per cent in terms 
of after tax costs, cf. Table 1.2. Much more modest effects are demonstrated for lower and 
more reasonable discount rates and shorter holding periods. The assumed realistic holding 
period is set to 2 years which is still somewhat high for an average allowance. When it comes 
to grandfathered allowances, the effects are even smaller since we know that allocation will 
be yearly and, therefore, does not allow for much storage. 
 
 
Table 1.2 NPV adjusted cost of buying/receiving 1 € allowance 
   Aggressive assumptions  Realistic assumptions 
Auctioning   After tax cost (€) 
Pct difference 
from worst  After tax cost (€) 
Pct difference 
from worst 
Immediate deduction  0.77  -8%  0.77  -1% 
Time of use deduction  0.83  -  0.77  - 
Depreciation  0.80  -4%  0.77  -0% 
Grandfathering         
Not taxable  0.00  -1%  0.00  -0% 
Taxable income  0.01  -  0.00  - 
   Note: Aggressive assumptions contain 10 pct discounting, 25 pct depreciation, storage rate of 10 pct, and a time 
frame of 8 years. Realistic assumptions are based on 5 pct discounting, 12.5 pct depreciation, storage rate of 5 pct, 
and a time frame of 2 years. In both cases, we have corporate tax rate of 23.5 pct. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics 
 
Second, our review of firms’ holding patterns suggests that very few firms hold allowances in 
excess of their actual needs for each compliance year. This has been so historically under 
rather lax emissions caps and is therefore likely to continue under future, stricter caps. Firms 
are free to involve in financial contracting to hedge risks over years, but that is a different tax 
issue. 
 
Third, the very low differences in NPV only leads to very limited tax induced shifts in 
abatement. Private firms only move abatement if there is a financial incentive to do so. Ac-
cording to our model estimate of abatement and its costs, we observe small shifts in country 
abatement of around 1-2 per cent for most countries due to differential tax treatment of al-
lowances. This leads to additional costs of around 2.6 million € under the aggressive assump-
tions from above, while the realistic assumptions yield an additional cost of 0.6 million €.   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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These figures must be seen in the light of total abatement costs of around 6 billion € for the 
20 per cent reduction target for 2020. Thus, the additional costs from differential tax treat-
ment are well below the 0.1 per cent level. 
 
Fourth, the model experiment assumes that favourable tax treatment associated with holding 
ETS allowances in excess of compliance requirements translates into a cost advantage for the 
domestic firms located in the tax regime. However, it is far from clear that this needs to be 
the case. Rather, it provides an incentive for all firms irrespective of their main tax residence 
or production sites to hold potential excess allowances in a country with a favourable tax 
climate, provided it has a sufficiently large positive taxable income in that country. 
 
1.4.  PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH CROSS BORDER TRADE IN ALLOWANCES 
As demonstrated above, the EU countries have taken different approaches to the treatment 
of ETS allowances, which could potentially give rise to problems when doing cross-border 
trade within the EU. There are traditionally two types of risk: (1) firms face double taxation 
or (2) firms are able to engage in tax arbitrage. 
 
In order to prevent international double taxation, tax treaties establish two categories of rules 
according to which the right to tax is allocated to one of the two contracting states. The first 
category of rules determines the respective rights to tax of the state of source and the state of 
residence with respect to different classes of income and capital. The second category of rules 
determines that the state of residence must allow a relief from double taxation if the state of 
source is allocated a full or limited right to tax.  
 
The OECD Model Tax Convention constitutes the basis of most of the tax treaties and es-
sentially provides five main categories for treating any taxable event with regard to ETS al-
lowances, namely ‘Business Profit’, ‘Movable Property’, ‘Royalty Income’, ‘Capital Gain’ or 
‘Other Income’.  No case has yet tested what classification would be used, but from the in-
quiry carried out for this study it appears that most countries will use the clause on business 
profits (article 7), which is also consistent with a treatment of allowances as a commodity, cf. 
Table 1.3.  
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Table 1.3  Expectation of OECD Model Tax Convention provision in Member States 
Provision  Countries  Number of countries 
Article 7 on Business Profit  Austria, Estonia (has been used in practice), France, 
Germany, Greece, Malta (if qualified as trading asset), 
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain 
10 
Article 6 on immovable Prop-
erty 
Italy  1 
Article 12 on Royalties  None  0 
Article 13 on Capital Gains  Bulgaria, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta (if qualified as 
capital  asset),  the  Netherlands,  Slovakia  and  Spain 
(depending on the qualification). 
7 
Article 21 on Other Income  Austria, Luxembourg, Malta and the Netherlands  4 
Source: Copenhagen Economics based on Deloitte study 
 
Despite the variety of treatments expected, we find the risk of double taxation to be limited 
as regards taxation of ETS allowances. The right to tax business profits, capital gain and 
other income is allocated to the residence state; a different qualification in the contracting 
states should not give rise to risks of double taxation apart from those that are involved in 
any cross-border activity and being non-specific to EU allowances.  
 
1.5.  GLOBAL TAX TREATMENT OF CDM/JI PROJECTS GIVES RISE TO MORE PROB-
LEMS 
As the qualification and tax treatment of participation in CDM and JI projects as well as the 
qualification and tax treatment of emission credits are subject to great uncertainties, several 
arbitrage opportunities may exist. However, it should be noted that great uncertainties may 
also prevent tax planning due to the lack of due process and may further result in double 
taxation and the avoidance of participating in CDM or JI projects. 
 
Potential tax planning opportunities can be divided into two main categories: (1) planning 
opportunities that occur due to inconsistent qualification or/and tax treatment of emission 
credits and participation in CDM/JI projects and (2) planning opportunities of more general 
character that also occur in relation to emission credits and CDM/JI projects. Below we have 
provided examples of both categories. 
 
Examples of category 1 opportunities: 
  Double non-taxation as a consequence of different interpretation of the term ‘perma-
nent establishment’, which is likely to arise as these projects differ significantly from 
other types of projects. CDM and JI projects are unique as these projects only has a po-
tential value due to legislation on the requirement of surrender of EUA’s combined 
with the possibility of generation of emission credits (CER’s and ERU’s). 
  Double non-taxation as a consequence of different tax characterisations and tax treat-
ments with respect to domestic tax legislation and/or different qualification pursuant to 
tax treaties. This issue is relevant with respect to the qualification and tax treatment of   ETS ALLOWANCES 
  13 
the emission credits, i.e. tax treatment of the grant hereof, trading and use to offset 
emissions in the EU ETS. 
  Utilisation of the different characterisations in the various jurisdictions with respect to 
treating engagement in emissions credits, CDM or JI projects as acquisition of an asset 
(emission credit) that may be reported in the balance sheet and amortised/depreciated 
versus treating engagement in CDM/JI projects as a deductible expense. Although this 
difference may only be of a temporary nature, it could have a significant impact on 
cash flows of multinational groups. 
 
Examples of category 2 opportunities: 
  Centralising the possession of the group’s participation in CDM, JI projects or group 
knowhow in one group company, which could serve as an intra-group ‘creation centre’. 
If the group expects the creation centre to be profitable, the creation centre could be 
placed in a low tax jurisdiction or in an affiliated company with tax losses carried for-
ward. If instead the creation centre is expected to be loss-making, it could be located in 
a profit-making affiliated company in a high tax jurisdiction.  
  Transfer pricing legislation is likely to apply in relation to such intergroup transactions. 
In this respect it should be noted that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines do not 
contain any guidelines on the estimation of appropriate transfer prices in the context of 
CDM/JI projects. 
 
1.6.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a whole, we find little evidence that the current construct of EU national taxes and 
OECD based bilateral tax treaties will lead to significant malfunctioning of the EU ETS, nor 
to problems in relation to cross border tax issues such as double taxation or tax arbitrage as 
far as we have been able to identify. In particular, welfare losses from tax induced distortions 
to the location of abatement activities will be relatively small compared to the massive levels 
of abatement the system will deliver and the overall yearly purchase costs of ETS allowances. 
Potentially larger problem relates to the tax treatment of expenses related to CMD/JI and in-
come from credits arising from such projects, partly specific to the nature of such projects 
and partly due to general transfer pricing problems arising in the evaluation of such projects, 
before they generate final credits vis-a-vis the ETS system. 
 
However, the lack of clarity and transparency in terms of the treatment that Member States 
will apply to ETS allowances leads to unnecessary compliance costs. Auditing firms and 
firms with ETS compliance obligations spend time on guessing what explicit tax system will 
eventually emerge in countries that have not yet implemented specific tax provisions. 
 
The EU and its Member States have several possible options.   
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The first and least complicated is to adopt a set of best practice rules for taxation, a code of 
essentially voluntary character. In our view, it could focus on a few key principles already 
outlined. Allowances should be treated as a commodity in national tax law and purchase 
costs deducted against the tax bill when the allowances are used for compliance. Any gains or 
losses resulting from changes in the price of allowances should be taxed when they are real-
ised, i.e. when the allowances are sold. Accrual taxation is certainly possible, but deviates 
from tax practice in Member States. The exception is financial institutions and professional 
traders where accrual taxation is the norm. We also suggest that taxation of free allowances 
be included in the best practice guideline. We have a preference for the model where they 
are not taxed with the counterpart that they cannot be deducted when used.   
 
In addition, it should be agreed in an appropriate OECD forum that ETS allowances in the 
context of bilateral treaties should be treated as business profits in line with the treatment as 
a commodity linked to firms ongoing production activities.  That means 1) if profits occur 
from selling an allowance, the revenue shall be added to taxable income and the purchasing 
price will be deducted against taxable income, hence the difference constitute business prof-
its, or 2) if the allowance is used for compliance in production of an end user product (e.g. 
power), the revenue from selling of the product is added to taxable income and the purchas-
ing price of the allowance will be deducted against taxable income in the year of use, hence 
the allowance is treated like a commodity. As regards the treatment of CDM/JI projects, 
some consensus on the treatment of the taxation of expenses as well as taxation of later emis-
sion credits would be beneficial. 
 
A second approach is to link a more co-ordinated approach to the taxation of ETS allow-
ances with the work to create a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base for businesses 
operating within the EU, abbreviated as CCCTB. The complexity for firms and authorities 
of having to operate in a patchwork of 27 national tax systems entails tax uncertainty, double 
taxation, as well as compliance costs. This has led the Commission to initiate the work to-
wards creating a CCCTB. If adopted, the CCCTB will make it possible for businesses to opt 
for taxation according to one set of common rules instead of national rules. 
 
There are three problems associated with use of the CCCTB to solve the ETS taxation prob-
lem, which in our evaluation suggests that this is not a promising route. First of all, it is not 
completely clear under the CCCTB rules how an asset should be recognised for tax pur-
poses. Indeed, the qualification of the ETS Allowance – as an intangible asset, a commodity 
or as a financial asset - could in itself prove to be difficult. So the implementation of a 
CCCTB does not solve the problem of recognition ‘automatically’, but still has to be de-
cided in advance (by the Commission). Second, potential benefits depend on whether busi-
nesses actually choose to opt for the CCCTB rules and whether a reasonable amount of 
Member States decides to introduce the CCCTB rules. As a consequence, the introduction 
of the CCCTB would not necessarily entail that all companies/groups involved with the EU 
ETS would end up being taxed according to the CCCTB rules. Third, the near term prob-
abilities of CCCTB being adopted and applied widely in the EU are not very high.    ETS ALLOWANCES 
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A third approach, or perhaps rather aspiration, would be if the ETS allowance could be said 
to fall within the EU's Interest and Royalty Directive. We did not find evidence of a risk of 
double taxation, but if transactions in allowances fall under the Interest and Royalty Direc-
tive this may prevent double taxation. However, the conclusion in this review is that income 
derived from EU ETS allowances or from CDM or JI projects are not covered by the notion 
of interests under the Directive as neither ETS allowances, nor CER’s and ERU’s qualify as 
debt claims. Furthermore, it is submitted that payments for the use of – or the right to use – 
ETS Allowances, CER’s or ERU’s are not covered by the notion of royalties for the purpose 
of the Directive. 
 
 
   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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Before turning to the four tasks, we will outline the overall purpose and the overall design 
elements of a common cap-and-trade scheme such as the EU ETS. This is done in order to 
create a benchmark when evaluating current tax treatment and proposing a solution to the 
identified issues. 
2.1.  POTENTIAL WELFARE LOSS DUE TO DIFFERENCE IN TAXATION 
The main objective in task number one of the study is to analyse and identify the features of 
a tax system that would serve the main purpose of the EU ETS. The main purpose is to 
abate the GHG emissions of the covered sectors along a least cost path. Below, we briefly 
outline  first the purpose and functioning of the EU ETS. Second, the potential conse-
quences in terms of loss of economic efficiency of having different tax treatment within the 
EU is outlined and whether those consequences are such that they might interfere with the 
overall purpose of the system. 
Purpose and means of EU-wide emission trading 
The EU has set a target of 20 per cent GHG abatement in 2020 compared to the 1990 level 
of emissions. Basically, this target could be reached within each country using only national 
means, implying that every country would reduce emissions from emitters within the coun-
try's own borders by 20 per cent. Alternatively, this target could be reached without having 
to distinguish between national affiliations of the emitters. In this case, the EU is taken all 
together ‘as one country’. The EU has chosen to do the latter for the sectors covered by the 
ETS. By allowing trade in GHG emission allowances, the actual abatement from the ETS 
sectors in each country will not necessarily be 21 per cent, which is the reduction required by 
the sectors covered by the EU ETS, but rather above or below.
1  
 
The main advantage of allowing trade in emission allowances is that the necessary abatement 
is achieved at least cost within the EU. If the GHG abatement target of 20 per cent was set 
for each country and had to be reached by only national means, the overall cost of reaching 
the target would be higher than necessary. This is due to the fact that some amount of 
abatement could be reallocated between countries with different marginal abatement costs, 
thus reaching the same amount of abatement but at a lower cost. 
 
By designing a common market for abatement of GHG, we might expect that the entities 
with the highest abatement costs also have the highest willingness to pay (WTP) for the right 
to emit. We may thus expect that the market will allocate emission rights according to the 
highest WTP, thus the entities with the lowest abatement costs will choose to abate rather 
than emit. 
 
                                                        
1 The overall target is – 20 per cent for the EU as a whole. This target is divided into -21per cent for the ETS sec-
tors and -10 per cent for the non-trading sectors. In the ETS sectors abatement will take place wherever it is cheap-
est, independent of national borders. For the non-trading sectors there are national binding targets, which are dif-
ferent for each MS. 
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  17 
The choice of whether or not to emit is made by observing the market price of allowances. 
The market provides a price of emission allowances, which is used as input by the entities 
considering whether or not to emit. 
Distortion of the EU-wide GHG abatement curve 
However, the entities covered by the ETS will not only use the market price of allowances as 
a parameter of decision but also the after-tax price, including tax consequences of alternative 
use of allowances.  As recognition of allowances for taxation may differ between countries 
the tax consequences may also differ (despite the pre-tax price being the same), potentially 
affecting the least cost order of abatement in the EU. A least cost order of GHG abatement 
in the ETS countries taken together is the benchmark for assessing the tax treatment of al-
lowances in the ETS countries.   
 
A least cost (pre-tax) order can graphically be illustrated as a marginal cost curve with all 
abatement segments ranked according to their cost, cf. Figure 2.1. In an optimal setting 
(with no distorting income taxation) only the segments up to the target will be activated, 
which is equivalent to abatement decisions being based on pre tax allowance prices.  
 
Figure 2.1 Pre-tax least cost order of CO2 abatement 
 
Source: Copenhagen Economics 
 
If the ranking of abatement segments changes in an after-tax set up, this may cause ‘expen-
sive’ abatements in the ‘wrong’ places. Graphically, this can be illustrated as segments of the 
EU-wide abatement curve ‘switching positions’. Hence, a segment with relative high costs 
will move from a position to the right of the target line to a position to the left of the target 








EU wide marginal cost 
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Figure 2.2 After-tax order of CO2 abatement - distorted 
 
Source: Copenhagen Economics 
 
Please note that two segments initially located to the left of the target on the least cost curve 
may also switch positions (not illustrated). However, this will in the long run not be a prob-
lem in terms of economic efficiency as both segments would be activated anyway.
2 So in 
practice it implies that emitters with higher marginal abatement costs in the upper segment - 
for example because they have already accomplished investments in energy efficiency meas-
ures – will have a lower marginal willingness to pay than producers in the lower segment as 
the latter due to a better tax treatment face lower after tax costs.  
2.2.  CORE DESIGN FEATURES OF EU ETS 
In order to assess the impact of differences in tax consequences some core features of the 
ETS instruments must be in place. 
Number of allowances, the ‘cap’ 
The EU ETS is a cap-and-trade scheme, the ‘cap’ being the total number of allowances (also 
labelled EUA) in the system in each trading period. From 2013 onwards, there is a single cap 
on the number of allowances for the whole EU (top down), instead of national allocation 
plans as in 2008-12 (bottom up). The number of allowances will be defined in such a way 
that there will be a linear 1.74 reduction in the number of allowances each year compared to 
the annual average of the 2008-2012 allocations, adjusted to take account of e.g. the wider 
scope as from 2013. 
Methods for allocation 
The allowances will be allocated in two different ways, which is relevant to note also in terms 
of tax treatment. EUA’s will be allocated for free and by auctioning. 
  In the first and second trading periods the major part of allowances are allocated 
free of charge (at least 95 per cent in the first and 90 per cent in the second period).  
                                                        
2 If timing issues, i.e. by calculating the NPV of abatement costs, are taken into account, economic efficiency might 
be harmed as this is not in accordance with the principle of ‘harvesting the low-hanging fruits first’. 
2020 target Abatement
Abatement 
cost € / tonne
EU wide marginal cost 
abatement curve  ETS ALLOWANCES 
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  In the third period, the power generators, due to their capacity to pass on the cost 
of allowances in consumer prices, will face full auctioning from the start while for 
the industrial installations auctioning will be gradually phased in with a view to full 
auctioning by 2027. 
Storage of allowances 
Storage of allowances between years is a core feature of the EU ETS scheme. This feature is 
important, particularly in terms of economically efficient abatement of CO2 as this allows 
the companies to utilise the allowances at times when utilization creates the highest value, 
both for the company and for society. Take a coal fired power station as an example. Coal 
and allowances are complimentary inputs to the generation of power. Assume that coal is a 
scarce resource. Thus, the generator would therefore have to decide whether to generate at 
time t or store the coal to generate power at time t+1. If only coal is allowed to be stored but 
not the allowances, this might create in-optimal decisions in terms of power generation.  
 
Between Phase II and III in EU ETS, rules allow allowances to be stored or banked
3 for use 
in future phases of trading, i.e. unlimited banking of allowances between the periods 2008-
12 and 2013-20, and future periods. Within Phase III, allowances issued from January 1, 
2013 and onwards are valid for emissions until 2020. 
 
Theoretically, two types of allowances may exist in terms of storage; either allowances issued 
with a future vintage year, whereby entities cannot surrender the allowance before the allow-
ance’s ‘vintage’ year (that is, the first year the allowance can be surrendered) or allowances, 
which can be used for compliance now or be stored for future use. The first type is treated in 
the green paper from the Australian Government
4. 
 
However, allowances with a future date are not a part of the EU ETS scheme. This implies 
that firms only can hedge against future allowance price changes by either buying more al-
lowances than they expect to use within the current year or by engaging in purely financial 
hedging. There is a well defined forward market for allowances covering future years. As full 
storage is allowed the price of such a forward contract is essentially equal to the price of the 
current year plus the financing costs of holding that contract.  
The instruments: EUA, CER and ERU 
In addition to EUA’s the companies in the EU ETS can make use of the so called flexible 
mechanisms in the Kyoto protocol. The instruments that are accepted in ETS, apart from 
EUA’s, are CER credits generated by the emissions-saving projects in developing countries 
in the context of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and ERU credits from emissions-
saving projects in non-Annex 1 countries via JI’s. 
                                                        
3 Storage of allowances between trading periods in the EU ETS is called “banking”. It does not differ fundamentally 
from ‘storage’, but the term ‘banking’ is explicitly used when talking about storage of allowances between ETS trad-
ing periods. 
4 Australian Government (2008)   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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The use of CER’s/ERU’s is restricted. It is an explicit restriction that CDM and JI projects 
shall be a supplement to domestic abatement. The overall amount of credits used for com-
pliance under the EU ETS should not exceed 50 per cent of EU emissions reductions during 
the period 2008 – 2020. From the start up to March 2010 only a marginal part of total cer-
tificates  surrendered  have  been  CER’s/ERU’s.  About  160 million  CER’s  and  3  million 
ERU’s have been surrendered.
5 This should be compared to about 2,000 million EUA’s per 
year. These proportions are partly due to the low carbon prices in the first phases of ETS, 
where fewer CDM/JI projects provide certificates at lower costs than the cost of an EUA 
when prices are low.  
 
However, the potential for growth in the CDM sector is substantial. A recent study
6 esti-
mates that 700-1,800 million credits are available through projects at cost below today’s 
EUA price of around 16 €. With carbon prices at 30 €
7, the supply increases to 1,100-2,300 
million credits.
8 Due to this potential, CDM projects are of large relevance to any analysis of 
the ETS from a taxation perspective.   
 
A CDM project is initiated by an Annex 1 country, which seeks consent from the host coun-
try. The project initiator then submits a project plan to the CDM Executive Board (EB) for 
approval. The approval includes definition of baseline emissions, i.e. emissions in absence of 
the CDM project and estimation of additional reduction of emissions as a result of the pro-
ject by a designated entity called a Designated Operational Entity (DOE). After this is done 
the project is registered by the EB. When abatement occurs the DOE requests the EB to is-
sue CER’s. The CER’s are always issued after instructions from the EB and transferred to a 
so called holding account in an Annex 1 country or in a non-Annex 1 country with authori-
sation from an Annex 1 country
9.  Once credits have been issued by the United Nations’ 
CDM Executive Board they may be sold by project developers on the market and thus be-
come so called secondary CER’s.  
 
An interesting observation in the carbon market is that there is a significant price spread be-
tween the secondary CER’s, which do not inherit any of the risks from the CDM-project 
since they have already been issued, and EUAs.  In theory, as the secondary CER’s are free of 
project delivery risks, the prices of EUA’s and secondary CER’s should be equal since they 
represent the same amount of CO2 emissions reduction (one tonne). However, the price 
spread is due to two reasons. 
 
First, historically, a large share of the spread has been explained by uncertainties relating to 
the technical link between the European Commission’s ‘Community Independent Transac-
tion Log’ (CITL) and the United Nations’ ‘International Transaction Log’ (ITL). The ITL-
CITL connection involved the EU’s 27 Member States disconnecting their national regis-
                                                        
5 The Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) 
6 Frankhauser and Martin (2009) 
7 As foreseen by OECD (2009a) with a 20 per cent reduction target and gradually developing global markets for 
carbon. 
8 The span is due to uncertainties about the development of the CDM sector.    
9 UNFCCC website;  http://cdm.unfccc.int/Registry/transaction/index.html   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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tries and reconnecting them to the ITL. Simultaneously, the CITL connected directly to the 
ITL. These operations allowed the delivery of sellers’ international credits from the Kyoto 
Protocol (such as CER’s) into buyers’ EU national registries. This link was established on 
October 19, 2008 and before that date issued CER’s remained in the UN CDM Registry, 
waiting for the connection with the EU registry to be completed.
10  The historical  price 
spread has been around 5-6 € but after the ITL-CITL connection in October 2008 the 
spread has decreased to 2-3 €, cf. Figure 2.3. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Prices of EUA, secondary CER and price spread, 2007-2009, € / Tonne CO2 
 
Note: Data prior to March 2009 is not readily available; hence figure layout is not in CE format.   
Source:  Alberiola et al (2010) 
  
 
Second, a major reason for the price spread, and in our view the reason for today’s price 
spread, is that the Commission has established a limit on the use of CER’s of up to 13.4 per 
cent of the allocation from 2008 to 2012 on average. Due to the limit of 13.4 per cent on 
average of the credits surrendered, the secondary CER’s’ ‘exchange rate’ is smaller than for 
EUA’s, which leads to secondary CER’s being discounted with respect to EUA’s.
11  In other 
words, the supply of CER’s exceeds the demand and price then equals marginal cost of sup-
ply even though some buyers would be willing to pay up to the EUA price. It is important to 
note that the only ones who can immediately profit from the price spread are entities that 
are given free allowances; they may buy secondary CER and register them in their CITL, 
thereby offsetting their emissions. Subsequently, they may sell the EUA’s that were allocated 
to them and earn the price spread. Market players that have not received free EUA’s cannot 
do this. However, one has to bear in mind that this arbitrage opportunity is associated with a 
risk, namely that the 13.4 per cent ceiling is reached in which case any residual secondary 
CER’s they hold will lose all value  
 
                                                        
10 Chevallier (2010) 
11 Based on the reasoning in Alberiola et al (2010) 
EUA CER
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However, since the establishment of the ITL-CITL connection the potential benefit of such 
trade, i.e. the price spread between EUA’s and secondary CER’s, has decreased to about 2 €, 
cf. Figure 2.4.  
 
Figure 2.4 Prices of EUA, secondary CER daily future (spot) prices, 2009-10, € / Tonne 
CO2 
 
Note: Prices based on settlement price on each trading day. Spread defined as EUA price minus CER price.  
Source: European Climate Exchange, Historical Data 
 
 
With regard to tax treatment we do not see the issue regarding possibilities for arbitrage (or 
wind fall profits) as a tax issue. Instead, it is an issue regarding the design of the mechanisms 
for CO2 abatement and should be treated as such. 
 
Like EUA’s, CER’s and ERU’s may be transferred between Phase II and III. Upon request 
to national authorities, non-used CER/ERU’s from 2008-12 may be exchanged to EUA’s 
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We have identified five issues to be dealt with in order to design proper tax treatment of 
CO2 allowances: 
 
1.  How to recognize allowances for domestic tax law purposes (e.g. commodity, in-
tangible - or financial assets) and purpose of purchasing and holding the allowance 
2.  Which taxation principle to follow – inventory (market value) or realisation taxa-
tion 
3.  Tax treatment of allowances allocated for free 
4.  Tax treatment of allowances originated as CDM or JI 
5.  Tax treatment of penalties for non-compliance  
 
For each of the five issues we have put up the following framework for identifying proper 
taxation: 
 
  Which options do we have for taxation? 
  Pros and cons for different tax solutions 
 
As the study shall analyze and identify the features of a tax system that would serve the main 
purpose of the EU ETS system, we will assess the options for tax treatment bearing in mind 
that the aim is cost efficient GHG abatement and that a tax design must aim to be in line 
with accepted principles for taxation: 
 
  Simplicity 
  Predictability 
  Equity 
  Absence of double-tax and non-tax 
 
However, our focus will not be inefficiencies due to general differences in tax treatment, e.g. 
company taxation tax rates which differ between Member States leaving the after-tax price or 
tax value of costs defrayed for allowances at different levels. This holds for most costs for in-
put or depreciation of assets in the Member States and may not differ in terms of CO2 al-
lowances. 
 
In the paragraphs to follow we present our findings regarding proper tax treatment. How-
ever, one key point is worth underlining up front:  the potential problems arising from tax 
issues relate to the possibilities for storage. If an allowance is acquired and submitted for sur-
render/sold in the same accounting period, it will not matter in terms of real economics 
whether the allowance is recognized as commodity or intangible asset. The reason for this is 
that the cost (in principle) will be fully deductable against taxable income in that period irre-
spective of the tax treatment. Furthermore, if acquired and sold within the same year discus-
sions of taxation of gains or losses due to allowance price changes based upon realisation 
principle as opposed to inventory (market value) also become moot.  
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3.1.  ISSUE 1: HOW TO RECOGNIZE ALLOWANCES FOR DOMESTIC TAX LAW PUR-
POSES? 
When a company acquires an allowance either via secondary markets or via the auctioning 
procedure by the government, the existing income tax law would recognise the cost of ac-
quiring permits. Basically, there exist three options for recognition of allowances: 
 
1.  Commodity (deductable expense), 
2.  Intangible asset or  
3.  Financial asset 
 
The most important issue might not be which method to follow, but that differences in tax 
treatment between countries might be the main contributor to distortions in pricing and 
hence allocation of allowances between countries. However, by this we do not necessarily say 
that only harmonisation matters; actual choice of treatment will also matter. 
Commodity 
An allowance can be recognized as a commodity, thus it is a necessary expenditure incurred 
in carrying on business. In this way an allowance is an expenditure on a par with every other 
deductable expenditure in a business under most current tax laws. This means that persons 
carrying on a business can claim a deduction against their taxable income for expenditure in-
curred in carrying on that business. 
 
The allowance will be counted as cost upon purchase; there will be no further tax conse-
quences when the allowance is held and used for compliance. If the allowance is sold it will 
be counted as taxable income. Furthermore, if the allowance is purchased and used in the 
same accounting period it will be deductable against taxable income of that period. If the al-
lowance is purchased and stored for later use, it will have no immediate tax consequence; 
hence it will be added on the balance sheet as an asset with a deduction of the cost deferred 
to the time the allowance is used. 
Intangible asset 
An allowance can be recognized as an intangible asset. An incurred allowance is then capital-
ised (activated) in the company accounts and as such added to the balance sheet in the ac-
counts. When an asset is activated in the accounts it becomes eligible for depreciation; 
hence, the cost of the asset will be spread over a span of several years. The deprecation 
amount (in absolute €) in each accounting period will be deductable against the taxable in-
come of the business. Thus, there is a difference in principle vis-à-vis commodity treatment 
where tax deduction is deferred to the year when the allowance is used.  
Financial asset 
The final option is to recognize an allowance as a financial asset. In this way an allowance 
may  be  purchased  for  investment  purposes.  However,  we  have  to  distinguish  between 
whether purchase of allowances as a financial asset is part of core business or not. Allowances   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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recognised as financial assets may be purchased by banks and other financial intermediaries. 
Hence, it may be characterised as core business. If, say, an owner of real estate purchases al-
lowances in order to receive a payment of interest it may not be characterised as core busi-
ness. 
 
Alternatively, one could imagine that a purchase of an allowance may have the purpose of 
supplying price hedging to entities, which uses allowances for compliance. However, price 
hedging may also be managed without having a ‘physical’ allowance in stock. However, in 
this way hedging can be managed by the delivery of a ‘physical’ allowance instead of paying 
out the difference in hedging price and price at the so called delivery day. 
 
Allowances recognised as financial assets may be purchased as part of the core business and 
would be eligible for income taxation. In this way, there will be a deduction of the cost of 
purchase, which would be added to taxable income if sold.  
Purpose of holding an allowance 
In terms of allowing deduction for the costs incurred, the discussion of recognition is closely 
related to the discussion of purpose of acquiring an allowance. The purpose of purchasing an 
allowance could be: 
 
  To meet the yearly obligation under the EU ETS 
  As an investment (not core business) 
  As part of a financial trading portfolio (core business) 
  Part of a CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) strategy or marketing campaign 
where allowances are surrendered voluntarily 
 
In terms of taxation, each of the purposes are highly coincident with the recognition of al-
lowances; e.g. the discussion of tax treatment if an allowance is treated as a commodity (rec-
ognition) and the discussion of tax treatment if the purpose is to meet an obligation (pur-
pose) can be expected to be equivalent. Hence, we are only treating tax treatment in terms of 
recognition. 
Pros and cons for different solutions 
The basic difference between recognition as a commodity or as an intangible asset is when to 
allow for deduction in the income. This difference in timing is the main driver for listing 
pros and cons.  
 
Timing issue. If treated as an intangible asset the opening value of the allowance is the part 
of departure for depreciation. However, depreciation is a term used to describe the cost of 
using the asset due to normal wear and tear or a decrease in value over time under normal 
circumstances (patent). An allowance is not exposed to wear and tear and cannot be expected   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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to decrease in value over time from other reasons than variation in market price.
12 Treating 
the allowance as an intangible asset as opposed to a commodity does not secure convergence 
between time of cost incurred and income. Hence, it may create over-incentives to purchase 
allowances in order to carry out tax-planning.   
 
Simplicity. Treating the allowance as a commodity, where the cost of purchase is deductable 
against income when the allowance is sold or surrendered, is simple. In this situation, the 
company  does  not  have  to  keep  track  of  depreciation  and  primo/ultimo  book  value 
throughout the lifetime of the allowance as it has to if treated as an intangible asset. This 
might be time consuming especially in a situation where more allowances are acquired at dif-
ferent times.  
 
Other inputs. Treating the allowance as a commodity is in par with treatment of other in-
puts into the manufacturing of goods. The owner of a coal fired power plant may view an al-
lowance equivalent to a piece of coal as both are necessary inputs for the generation of 
power.    
 
Capital gains. If capital gains are treated differently compared to direct income in terms of 
tax, tax treatment of allowances should not differ for this type of financial asset. Otherwise 
this may distort the portfolio of investments. However, given that most allowances are pur-
chased for compliance and tax treatment of these may differ, incentives for purchase of al-
lowances would also differ. 
3.2.  ISSUE 2: WHICH REALISATION PRINCIPLE TO FOLLOW? 
Two methods that could be used to determine the values of allowances in terms of tax 
treatment are inventory or realisation taxation. 
 
If allowances are treated according to the inventory or the market value principle, any differ-
ence in the value of allowances held at the beginning of an income year and at the end of 
that year would be reflected in taxable income, with: 
  any increase in value included as assessable income 
  any decrease in value allowed as a deduction 
 
Under the market value method, the closing value of an allowance would be equal to the 
market value of the allowance at the end of the income year. 
 
If allowances are treated according to the realisation principle, any difference in the purchase 
price of allowances and the selling price would be reflected in taxable income with: 
  any positive difference (gain) included as assessable income 
  any negative difference (loss) allowed as a deduction 
                                                        
12 This is also recognised in Estrada et al (2009).   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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Pros and cons for different solutions 
The difference in the taxation principles is timing of taxation. If the inventory principle is 
applied changes in value will be added/deducted from taxable income at the end of each ac-
counting period. If the realization principle is applied taxation will take place when the al-
lowance is sold (or used for compliance). 
 
The difference in taxation will, however, only have significant economic impacts if the mar-
ket price of allowances is volatile, showing huge fluctuations between (and not within) the 
accounting periods. In case the price stays constant choice of principle is not important. 
Whether the price of a good stays more or less constant through periods depends on the pos-
sibility for storage. Power cannot be stored, hence that way we see much price volatility on 
the power exchanges. Regarding allowances, we might expect that prices will only show mi-
nor fluctuations, as the storage (and banking) option will dampen fluctuations. There have 
been price fluctuations in the past, but they may be dampened in the future because of im-
proved banking options. 
 
If prices on the other hand fluctuate the pros and con for each solution become relevant. We 
have identified the following pros and cons for the inventory principle: 
 
Pros:  
  Economically correct and neutral treatment of allowance value, including gain 
and loss. Important in markets with price volatility and expected gains in price 
due to Hotelling rent
13. The taxpayer should be indifferent (from a tax perspec-
tive) as to whether they sell or retain the allowances. This will be secured by the 
inventory principle as the taxpayer will be taxed (or may claim a deduction) 
whether or not the allowance is sold or used. Hence, the taxation will not have 
influence on the decision to sell or keep. 
  Completely transparent market values in real time. Traditional problems with 
getting good estimates of market values are non-relevant. The price of allow-
ances in ETS is transparent as trade of allowances is part of the trading portfolio 
of the power and climate exchanges all over Europe. Moreover, as no physical 
barriers exist for trading (in contrast to power trade), only one price for allow-
ances exists in the entire Europe at one point in time. So, the traditional prob-
lem and burdensome issue of getting correct estimates of market prices does not 
exist in terms of tax treatment of allowances. However, this issue might not be 
counted as a ‘pro’ for inventory taxation. We have placed it here just to highlight 




                                                        
13 Also known as Hotelling's rule, which says that owners of a ‘non-replaceable’ asset will seek to maximise profit, 
hence price volatility.   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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Cons:  
  There is the potential for taxpayers to be taxed on unrealised gains under the in-
ventory principle. This might occur where the value of allowances suddenly in-
creases before year end but goes back to trend level a few days later. This may re-
sult in taxpayers being taxed on gains that they are unlikely ever to realise—
although a deduction could be allowed in the subsequent year if prices fall back 
to trend at the end of that year. 
  Taxing of unrealised gains, not in par with current praxis of definition of assess-
able income. Inventory taxation is the exception rather than the norm for other 
expenditure linked to the running of the firms. 
 
We have for the realization principle identified the following pros and cons, realizing that 
these might to some degree be a mirrored image of the inventory principle. 
 
Pros: 
  Avoids the taxing of unrealised gains, which due to substantial price fluctuation 
may have some effects on firms’ cash flow positions. 
 
Cons: 
  Keep a record of the purchase cost of each allowance until it is surrendered or sold 
(each allowance is unique and can be identified with a serial number). The combi-
nation of uniqueness and the realisation principle means that a company that sells 
or uses an allowance for compliance needs to know, which exact allowance that is 
depreciated from the accounts. 
3.3.  ISSUE 3: TAX TREATMENT OF ALLOWANCES ALLOCATED FOR FREE? 
 
As the ETS Directive allows for transitional free allocation of allowances for free (mainly due 
to the risk of carbon leakage), the question of tax treatment of free allowances arises. We 
have identified two options for tax treatment presently in use: 
 
1.  No recognition of the allowance as taxable income. Purchase cost zero, hence no 
deduction in taxable income when surrendered or sold (but added to taxable in-
come if sold). 
 
2.  Recognize the allowance as taxable income with market price at granting period be-
ing used as purchase costs, deducted from taxable income when surrendered or 
sold. 
 
Allocation of allowances in the period of 2005-2012 was for the majority of allowances 
(around 95 per cent) allocated for free and based upon grandfathering with the number of 
allowances linked to historical emissions.  This is important as we are mainly looking at po-  ETS ALLOWANCES 
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tential distortions in the ETS market from unequal/non-appropriate taxation. Given the 
character of the allowance – unlinked to actual or future behaviour of the receiving firms 
with some caveats
14 - differences in taxation levels between countries have little or limited 
impact on companies' choice of location. 
 
Post 2012 we move on to a different framework, in which allowances will be increasingly 
auctioned. Apart from an optional and limited exception for some power plants, only indus-
trial firms will receive allowances for free. The allowances will be allocated based on ex-ante 
benchmarks. The annual allocation per installation is fixed before the beginning of each 
trading period and changes in production levels during a trading period do not influence the 
allocation. No free allocation will be given to an installation that has ceased its operations, 
unless the operator demonstrates that this installation will resume production within a speci-
fied and reasonable time. Hence, any differences in taxation between countries will represent 
distortions of competition.  
In defining the principles for setting ex-ante benchmarks in individual sectors or sub-sectors, 
the starting point shall be the average performance of the 10 per cent most efficient installa-
tions in a sector or sub-sector in the Community in the years 2007-2008.
15  
Although allocations are to be determined in advance for the entire third phase and no ex-
post adjustment is foreseen, significant extensions of production capacity will be allowed ad-
ditional free allocation and, in parallel, free allocation will be updated for installations that 
partly or fully cease their operations.
16 We note that increased allocation of free allowances is 
only possible if production capacity, and not production, is increased while a reduction of 
free allowances might take place if operations, i.e. production, are partly or fully ceased. This 
distinction is important to avoid that unutilised capacity, which of course does not emit any 
greenhouse  gasses,  generates  free  allowances.  If  unutilised  capacity  or  ceased  operations 
would still get free allowances incentives would be introduced to avoid maintenance and in-
stead build new installations, which would generate additional free allowances.  
 
To be able to allow for additional free allowances to capacity increases and new entrants, a 
buffer  of  allowances will  be established
17; 5  per cent  of  community-wide allowances for 
2013-2020 are put away for new entrants
18. However, the definitions of ‘significant exten-
sions’ and ‘new entrants’ are not yet clarified. These definitions and the implementation 
                                                        
14 The allowances are not totally decoupled; receiving firms have to maintain use of the production capacity that 
provided the reasoning for the granting of allowances in the first place. However, there is no requirement in the Di-
rective to maintain a certain production level.  Some Member States included specific closure rules in their National 
Allocation Plans for the second trading period and that detailed rules will be developed under Article 10a(19) and 
(20) for the third and future periods. Moreover, most countries have set aside reserves of free allowances for new en-
trants with allocations being based upon their actual needs; hence also here we have some coupling between ac-
tual/future emissions and the amount of allowances received. 
15 EC (2009),  Directive 2009/29/EC, Article 10a, paragraph 2 
16 EC (2009),  Directive 2009/29/EC, Article 10a(20) 
17 EC (2009),  Directive 2009/29/EC, Article 10a, paragraph 7 
18 The concept of ‘New entrants’ is to be defined by Dec 31 2010   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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In essence, we argue for a harmonised approach between Member States for the future. In 
the choice of norm, we would argue that the pros and cons for taxation/non-taxation are as 
follow. We will treat option 1 and 2 together, by treating option 1 as they are mirrored im-





  By recognition of the allowance as taxable income, cash-flow and timing disadvan-
tages may arise if entities are given a large number of free allowances and they choose 
to store those rather than using them for compliance at the end of the income year. 
This will result in a larger tax liability due to the recipient being assessed on the value 
of the free allowances that they might not surrender in that year.  
Cons:  
  A longstanding principle in the income tax system is that assessable income should 
include the value of benefits obtained, whether in the form of money or assets, that 
are directly related to a business or income-producing activity. This includes benefits 
obtained as free allowances. To ensure that the tax system supports the achievement 
of cost effective reductions in GHG, the tax treatment of free allowances and auc-
tioned allowances must be tax neutral to the greatest extent possible. With no taxa-
tion of free allowances, receivers have an over-incentive to keep and use the allow-
ances. By leaving the allowances to be purchased by the market, companies with 
higher marginal cost of GHG abatement are able to keep up production while com-
panies receiving allowances for free (and with lower abatement costs) might cease 
production or improve energy efficiency. 
  If allowances are recognized as taxable income, with market price at granting period 
being used as purchase cost, the company will also be allowed a deduction in taxable 
income when the allowance is surrendered or sold. This will in principle leave the 
company equally well off ‘at the end of the day’ compared to a regime of no taxation. 
  Regarding cash-flow and timing (2
nd bullet of pros), we do, however, see three argu-
ments for these problems not to become significant. First, free allowances being pro-
vided to emission-intensive trade-exposed entities are allocated on an annual basis 
rather than up front in year one for the rest of the trading periods (until 2020), re-
ducing potential tax liability. Second, as the number of free allowances are allocated 
based on average energy efficiency for the 10 per cent most efficient companies, the 
number of allowances will be tight. Hence, for this reason we do not expect storage 
of allowances to be pronounced. Third, allowances are tradeable. Hence, there is an 
                                                        
19 EC (2009), Directive 2009/29/EC, Article 10a(1) and (20).   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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active secondary market. An entity will be able to ameliorate cash-flow problems by 
selling allowances in that market in one period and buy back in later periods.   
  However, banking could be done if the companies receiving free allowances in addi-
tion also purchased the cheaper secondary CDM’s and used these for compliance. 
The company would then be able to sell the allowances allocated for free and hence 
make an immediate net gain, because the market price of EUA´s are higher than for 
CDM’s. This may be an argument for taxation of free allowances if this “traffic” 
should emerge, however the difference in price is a kind of a natural risk premium 
from potentially not being able to use CDM’s for compliance, cf. the constraints pre-
sented in the previous chapter.  
3.4.  ISSUE 4: TAX TREATMENT OF ALLOWANCES ORIGINATED AS CDM (OR JI)? 
Before an allowance originated as CDM is turned into a secondary CER and becomes eligi-
ble for the EU ETS, an investor has to accomplish a project generating CDM. We expect 
that an investor has expenses before the project actually returns a benefit in terms of allow-
ances. The question is then how these expenses should be treated in terms of tax treatment? 
 
We have identified three options for tax treatment: 
1.  Allow deductions for project expenses incurred against taxable income as they ma-
terialise continually. 
2.  Do not allow deductions for project expenses incurred, but difference in accumu-
lated cost and market price taxable when surrendered for compliance (inventory 
principle). 
3.  Do not allow deductions for project expenses incurred, but the allowances originat-
ing from the project are activated at the value of the accumulated costs, followed by 
taxation when the allowances are sold /used for compliance (realisation principle). 
 
The three options differ in terms of their costs of generating allowances. The first option has 
the highest tax value in terms of NPV as deductions for expenses are allowed at an earlier 
stage. The second and third options are basically variants of taxation according to the inven-
tory and realisation. Hence, when the allowances are ‘ready for use’ tax treatment could be 
done according to one of two of these principles. 
Pros and cons for different solutions 
In terms of pros and cons we do not treat differences between options 2 and 3 as this has 
been done under issue number 2. Hence, we will only distinguish between options 1 and 
2/3. 
 
Allowing deductions for project expenses incurred against taxable income as they materialise 
continually is not in line with current tax principle. These expenses may be characterised as 
investments, hence they cannot be treated as operating costs in terms of taxation. A relevant 
benchmark is a firm’s investment in new equipment that reduces future emissions. Such in-  ETS ALLOWANCES 
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vestments would – if above a trivial value defined by domestic law – have to be activated and 
subsequently depreciated over their economic life time.  
 
Pros for option 2 and 3 are, hence, that these options are in line with current taxation prin-
ciples and practice; investment expenses are non-deductible when occurred. We find the op-
tions in line with the principle of tax-neutrality. In a tax-neutral environment, a liable entity 
would not be influenced by the tax treatment when deciding whether to purchase allowances 
issued within EU ETS or to accomplish a project generating CDM or JI for later use in 
ETS. 
 
In practice, we find the issue of taxation of CDM projects relatively straightforward. The 
costs of the project producing an offset in the form of a credit should be treated according to 
the general principles applying to the type of expenditure used. In practice, all spending on 
personnel costs would typically be deductable in the year in which they occur while purchase 
of investment goods would have to depreciate over the life time of the project. Upon the 
project that has been qualified to generate credits (secondary CDM), the credits can be sold 
and the price of the credits should be subject to normal income taxation.  This could ensure 
neutrality vis-à-vis tax treatment of investment in abatement within EU.  
 
We acknowledge that price differences between secondary CDM’s and EUA’s exist, which 
gives opens up some possibilities for short term gains at the cost of long term risks. However, 
we do not regard this possibility as a taxation issue; partly due to fact that the difference is a 
result of the chosen design of GHG abatement mechanisms in Europe, thus the limit on the 
use of CER’s (primary or secondary) of up to 13.4 per cent of the allocation from 2008 to 
2012 on average. Partly due to the fact that the price difference only reflects the risk pre-
mium of purchasing a CDM instead of a EUA
20, hence this risk premium is the market reac-
tion on the design features.  
 
3.5.  ISSUE 5: TAX TREATMENT OF PENALTIES 
An important element of a cap-and-trade-scheme such as the EU ETS is that entities will 
face a penalty in case of non-compliance with the obligation to surrender allowances to cover 
last year’s emissions by April 30 each year. Under the EU ETS system, this penalty is 100 € 
per tonne CO2 emitted and in addition, the obligation to surrender the missing number of 
allowances still remains.  
 
There are two options for tax treatment of penalties: 
1.  Not deductable against taxable income 
2.  Deductable against taxable income 
 
                                                        
20 See Chevallier (2010)   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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It is obvious that the difference in impact of choosing option one or two is the tax value. If a 
deduction is allowed the tax value of the deduction will be equal to the company tax rate x 
100 € per tonne.  
 
In terms of pros and cons of allowing deductions for penalties, it is to some degree a non-
issue. The discussion of allowing a deduction shall be seen together with the level of penalty.  
The level of penalty can be adjusted to reflect a deduction or not a deduction, barring in 
mind that it is difficult to adjust as the level of the penalty is set in the Directive. However, 
the correct level of penalty in order to secure correct incentives is to set the penalty just as 
high as to give the market an incentive to abate the target of 20 per cent put up for the EU.  
Basically, one could argue that the penalty represents a cost to the entity, hence a deduction 
should be allowed according to the tax principle of simplicity; in a simple tax system all costs 
relevant for running the business should be deductable against taxable income.  On the other 
hand, as the objective of the penalty is to ensure compliance, it should maybe not be consid-
ered as a normal business expense, hence deductions should not be allowed.   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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In this chapter we will present our findings on problems in terms of welfare economics, op-
portunities for tax arbitrage and risk of double taxation.  This presentation will be based on 
the information of national tax treatment collected by the questionnaire from Deloitte
21. The 
focus of the first section 4.1 will on the distortions created by differences in taxation between 
countries while the next section 4.2 will discuss possible welfare losses at the EU level that 
such distortions may cause. The following two sections review opportunities for tax planning 
as well as risk of double taxation linked to trade in EUA allowances within the EU (section 
4.3) as well as trade in CDM and JI (section 4.4). 
4.1.  DISTORTIONS  FROM  DIFFERENCES  IN  CARBON  PRICING  BETWEEN  COUN-
TRIES  
Both within the EU27 Member States and between EU and other non-EU countries, where 
a cap-and-trade scheme has been/will be introduced, tax treatment of allowances differs. 
This may cause potential distortions and tax arbitrage within EU27 and between EU and the 
other areas if/when the EU scheme will be linked to other schemes.  
Issue 1: Recognition of allowances for tax treatment  
As stated in the previous chapter there are basically three methods for recognition of allow-
ances in terms of tax treatment: commodity (deductible expense), intangible asset, or finan-
cial asset.  
 
Based on the questionnaire we (Deloitte) have carried out in the EU27 Member States plus 
four other European countries as well as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and USA, the 
overall conclusion to be drawn is that for the vast majority of countries it is not crystal clear, 
which kind of treatment is actually used. A significant number of the reporting countries 
state that the most likely characterisation is that of an intangible asset. However, some of 
these reporting countries have addressed uncertainty with respect to the actual classification, 
whereby the above classification is considered the best practical advice to businesses. 
 
The actual possibility of claiming a deduction or depreciation against taxable income is what 
constitute the actual company incentives, hence the possibility for distortions or tax arbi-
trage. From the questionnaire there seems to be three approaches to deduction or deprecia-
tion: (1) no depreciation or deduction, (2) the possibility to make depreciation and (3) the 
possibility to make a deduction.  
 
It seems that in some of the countries there is more than one option for tax treatment, i.e. 
that the actual treatment is unclear. In order for us to draw some kind of conclusion – but 
also for the purpose of modelling distortions – we have chosen to summarize the national tax 
treatment based on an assumption of rational choice of tax treatment among the companies. 
                                                        
21 See appendix for the Deloitte study. 
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In other words, we assume that the companies will choose the method that minimizes the 
company’s tax base.  
 
Based on this assumption we have made two observations. First, we recognise that the vast 
majority of the companies (in the different national countries) will de facto choose to treat 
allowances as a commodity, cf. Table 4.1. However, a closer study of this would reveal that 
some of these countries actually recognise allowances as an intangible asset, but at the same 
time does not allow for depreciation and instead allow for deduction. In this way, the de 
facto tax treatment of allowances is recognised as a commodity. 
 
Table 4.1 Tax treatment of allowances in EU Member States  
Issue    Treatment   
Treatment of allowance  Commodity  Intangible asset 
Time of deduction  Immediate  When used  Depreciation allowed 
Countries  BE, DE, FR, GR, IE, LU, NL,   DK, GB, IT, SE, PL, CY, CZ, SK,  AT, ES, FI, HU, BG 
  MT, EE  SI, LT, LV, RO   
Taxation of free allowances  Taxed when received  Not taxed 
Countries  ES, GB, GR  AT, BE, BG, CZ, CY, DE, DK, EE, FI, FR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, 
    MT, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SK, SI  
Note: Some countries seemingly allow different treatment of allowances. When this is the case, we select the treat-
ment that is most favourable from a net present value perspective. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics based on Deloitte study. 
 
 
Second, we recognise that almost half of the countries where de facto recognition is of the 
commodity type allow for deduction at the time of purchase (‘immediate’) where the rest of 
these countries only allow at the time of use. In terms of net present tax value, these two 
groups actually constitute the upper and lower bound, where the countries allowing for de-
preciation lies in between. In our point of view, ‘trade’ of allowances between countries rep-
resenting the upper and lower bound has the greatest potential for tax arbitrage or distortion 
of trade. This is due to the fact that net present tax value between these countries differs; 
hence the economic impact for a company purchasing allowances in an ‘immediate’ country 
may be more beneficial than purchasing allowances in a ‘time of use’ country.  
 
In the next paragraph we illustrate by simple numerical examples the impact in terms of dif-
ference in cost due to differences in tax treatment.  
 
Impact of different solutions 
In order to illustrate the impact of differences in recognition of allowances, we have provided 
a small numerical example.  By calculating the net present value (NPV)
22 of the tax value we 
are able to assess the consequences of the different options. The option with the highest 
NPV of taxation provides the lowest costs for the firms. So, if different tax systems yield dif-
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ferent NPV values, then this may effectively change the ordering of pre-tax abatement costs 
within the EU. 
 
The assumptions are: 
  a price of an allowance of 25 € in period 0 (corresponding to one ton of CO2) 
  depreciation rate of 40 per cent  (Declining-Balance Method) 
  income tax rate of 25 per cent 
  discount rate of 5 per cent 
  the allowance is purchased primo period 0 and held until ultimo period 2 (situa-
tion 2), thus the time length of holding the allowance is three periods 
  selling price of allowance is 0 ultimo period 2 (situation 2), this is done in order to 
be able to carry out accelerated depreciation at the time of selling the allowance 
 
We have to distinguish between two situations with regard to storage: 
 
  Situation 1: The allowance is purchased and used for compliance / sold immedi-
ately after purchase, i.e. the allowance is held only for a short period within the 
same accounting period 
  Situation 2: The allowance is held over a minimum of two years, thus the allow-
ance is stored and transferred between minimum two accounting periods 
 
In situation 1, the tax consequences of different treatment will have no real economic impact 
since the permit is used immediately after purchase (or within the same accounting period). 
 
If the allowance is recognised as a commodity and used for compliance, the cost of purchase 
(=price) of the allowance would be fully deductable against income. If the allowance is sold, 
the cost of the allowance would be fully deductable against income and the selling price 
would be added to taxable income. In this case where purchase price is equal to selling price, 
this would cancel each other out leaving taxable income at zero. 
 
If the allowance is recognized as an intangible asset and used for compliance, the value 
(=price) of the allowance becomes eligible for accelerated depreciation and herby fully de-
ductable against taxable income. If the allowance is sold, the value of the allowance becomes 
eligible for accelerated depreciation and hereby fully deductable against taxable income. The 
selling price would then be added to taxable income. 
 
No matter how the allowance is recognised and no matter whether it is used for compliance 
or sold, this will have no real economic impact. Thus, based on a purchase price of 25 € and 
a corporate tax rate of 25 per cent the tax value is calculated to 6.25 €, independently of rec-
ognition of the allowance, cf. Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2 Tax value is the same if the allowance is held for only a short time 
After tax value, €   Sold  Surrendered / compliance 
Commodity (deductable expense) – deduction deferred until the 
time when the permit is surrendered or sold 
6.25  6.25 
Intangible assets – depreciation  6.25  6.25 
Intangible assets / commodity – immediate deduction   6.25  6.25 
Source: Copenhagen Economics 
 
In situation 2, the allowance is held for one period minimum (stored). The tax consequences 
of different treatments will in this case have a real economic impact. The after tax value will 
be higher if treated as an intangible asset with the possibility of amortization, allowing de-
ductibility for costs at an earlier point in time. As in situation 1 with no storage, it does not 
differ in terms of determination of tax value whether the permit is used for compliance or 
sold. 
 
In this situation, where the allowance is stored and treated as a commodity, the tax value will 
again be 6.25 €. However, as deductibility against taxable income is not allowed before the 
allowance is sold or surrendered (end of period 2), NPV of tax is only 5.4 €. On the other 
hand, if deductions are allowed at time of purchase NPV will be equal to the purchase price 
of 6.25 €. 
 
If the allowance is treated as an intangible asset, depreciation is allowed from the end of the 
first period and in each period until the allowance is sold or surrendered (or fully depreci-
ated). Hence, the holder of the allowance gets access to deductions against taxable income at 
an earlier stage. To be able to compare this with the case where the allowance is recognised 
as a commodity, we assume that the book value of the allowance at the end of period 2 be-
comes eligible for accelerated depreciation. This gives rise to a 5.9 € NPV of the tax. 
 
By allowing a deduction of the costs at the time of purchase, the after tax value has increased 
by 4.5 per cent compared to allowing a deduction at the time of use, cf. Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 The after tax value is higher if treated as an intangible asset 
  After tax value, €   Period 0  Period 1  Period 2  NPV (5 ) 
(1)  Commodity (deductable expense) – deduction deferred until the time 
the permit is surrendered or sold  0  0  6.25  5.4 
(2)  Intangible assets – depreciation  2.5  1.5  2.3  5.9 
(3)  Intangible assets / commodity – immediate deduction   6.25  0  0  6,25 
  Difference in NPV of (1) and (3) as a percentage of after tax price  (6.25-5.4)/((1-25) x €25)  4.5 % 
Note: If recognized as intangible asset, tax value is calculated as depreciation in € times income tax rate. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics 
Sensitivity analysis 
The question is now whether this difference in tax treatment potentially is able to become 
significant. The answer of this can be answered by looking at the financial impact of longer   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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holding periods and more aggressive discount rates. Our calculations below show that the 
more periods and/or higher discount rate, the higher are the differences in NPV of the tax 
value. 
 
If the number of periods are increased to ten (e.g. reflecting the period 2010 to 2020, second 
half of Phase II and entire Phase III) and we keep the discount rate at 5 per cent, the differ-
ence in NPV of the tax value will increase from 0.5 € (end period 2), cf. Table 4.3, to 1.8 € 
(end of period 9) if the allowance is recognised as an intangible asset instead of a commod-
ity, cf. Table 4.4. And between the two extremes in treatment; deduction at ‘time of use’ or 
immediate deduction the difference in NPV of tax value increase from 0.9 € if the allowance 
is held 3 periods to 2.3 € if the allowance is held 9 periods, cf. Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4 NPV as a function of periods the allowance is stored, €  
  Number of periods the allowance 
is held  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
(1)  Commodity (deductable expense) – de-
duction  deferred  until  the  time  the 
permit is surrendered or sold 
6,3  6,0  5,7  5,4  5,1  4,9  4,7  4,4  4,2  4,0 
(2)  Intangible asset  6,3  6,1  6,0  5,9  5,9  5,9  5,8  5,8  5,8  5,8 
(3)  Intangible  assets  /  commodity  –  im-
mediate deduction 
6.3  6.3  6.3  6.3  6.3  6.3  6.3  6.3  6.3  6.3 
  Difference (1) and (2) 
0,0  0,1  0,3  0,5  0,7  1,0  1,2  1,4  1,6  1,8 
  Difference (1) and (3) 
0.0  0.3  0.6  0.9  1.2  1.4  1.6  1.9  2.1  2.3 
Note: NPV is calculated primo the period. Ultimo value at time t-1=primo value at time t 
Source: Copenhagen Economics 
 
Analogously to the calculation of the difference in NPV illustrated in Table 4.3, we have also 
done calculations with more periods included for the ‘immediate’ and the ‘time of use’ de-
duction. With a discount rate of 5 per cent, the share of the difference in NPV to after-tax 
price will increase from 4.5 per cent to 11.8 per cent by the end of period 9, cf. Table 4.5.  
 
The choice of discount rate does off course also play a role for the NPV of the tax. Table 4.5 
therefore shows the economic impact of decreasing the rate to 2 per cent vs. increasing the 
rate to 7 per cent. If the allowance is hold 9 periods, the low discount rate at 2 per cent en-
tails the difference in NPV of tax value to the after tax price is only 5.4 per cent. This ratio 
increase to 15.2 per cent if the discount rate is increased to 7 per cent, cf. Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5 Ratio of difference in NPV of tax value and after tax price, %  
Number  of  periods 
the allowance is held  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
NPV (2%)  0.0  0.7  1.3  1.9  2.5  3.1  3.7  4.3  4.9  5.4 
NPV (5%)  0.0  1.6  3.1  4.5  5.9  7.2  8.5  9.6  10.8  11.8 
NPV (7%)  0.0  2.2  4.2  6.1  7.9  9.6  11.1  12.6  13.9  15.2 
Source: Copenhagen Economics 
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The basic conclusions drawn from the above analysis is that substantial impact on the after-
tax costs resulting from different tax systems of purchasing ETS allowances requires that 
storage is substantial and discount rates non-trivial.  However, one central design feature of 
the EU ETS may dampen the use of storage; allowances are issued on a yearly basis. Hence, 
future dated allowances are not present in ETS. This contrasts most other commodities, 
which can be purchased and stored for later use, and the design of the upcoming Scheme in 
Australia seems to pursue the opposite strategy of auctioning all allowances for long periods 
up front. If similar large-scale storage was possible in the EU ETS, allowances could be pur-
chased, deducted from taxable income and stored for later use, thus enhancing the effect of 
different national tax treatment in EU. 
 
However, we do not expect that the difference in recognition has a potential to create sig-
nificant distortions in terms of cost efficient CO2 abatement and/or tax arbitrage.  As dem-
onstrated above, tax related distortions will only arise if allowances are stored for a significant 
amount of time. Current experience from the 2
nd trading period shows that less than 10 per 
cent of allocated allowances in the years 2008 and 2009 have been stored for later use, cf. 
Table 4.6 
 
Table 4.6 Instruments used in the ETS in 2008-9, millions 
  2009  2008 
Allocated EUA  1,967  1,956 
Surrendered CER (CDM)  78  82 
Surrendered ERA (JI)  3,2  0,05 
Total emissions (MtCO2)  1,873  2,119 
Surplus  174  -81 
Surplus per cent (stored to later periods)  9%  -4% 
Source: Copenhagen Economics based on The Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) 
 
 
If this number of stored allowances continuous to stay below 10 per cent and even in some 
years goes below zero, we do not expect that the NPV of tax value will differ much between 
countries. Hence, distortion due to differences in tax treatment will become close to zero. 
This issue has been further analysed in the modelling section 4.2 above. 
 
 
Issue 2: Inventory or realisation principle 
Taxation of allowances according to the inventory or realisations principle is not of great 
importance among the countries included in the questionnaire by Deloitte. A question in 
this regard was not asked explicitly. However, from the answers it seems that almost every 
country does apply the realisations principle: 
 
According to the tax treatment (.....), the general picture is that the profit or loss is cal-
culated as the difference between the sales price and the acquisition price/booked value.   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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Deloitte (2010) “Study on the Tax Treatment of EU Allowances - The Issues of Corporate Income Taxation” 
 
As tax treatment relies on the actual sales price, this indicates that the realisation principle is 
applied. 
 
However, as a matter of completeness and for the purpose of addressing thoughts about a 
change in treatment, we have made a numerical example regarding the possible impact on 
company taxation from differential treatment.  
 
Impact of different solutions 
Regarding the impact of the taxation principle, we have in line with the previous issue pro-
vided a small numerical example. By going through the accounts from a fictive company, we 
show the economic consequences of difference in taxation principle.  
 
As in the previous issue, the difference has only a real economic impact if the permit is 
stored for use in later periods. If the allowance is not stored, the allowance becomes eligible 
for accelerated depreciation and hereby fully deductable against taxable income in the first 
accounting period. In this case, purchase price (realisation) will be equal to opening value 
(market value) and selling price (realisation) will be equal to closing value (market value). 
Hence, the tax payment will not differ in terms of timing and amount. 
 
If the allowance is kept for more than one period, our numerical example shows that there 
will be no difference in total payment of taxes, but timing of payment and tax base will dif-
fer. In addition, the numerical example will show that there in principle will not be any dif-
ference whether the allowance is sold or used for compliance (ultimo period 2) 
 
The assumptions are the following: 
  A company buys 10 allowances primo period 0 and holds them until ultimo pe-
riod 2 
  Buying price is 10 € per allowance  
  During period 0-2, the market price change to 15 €, 17 €, 16 €, respectively for 
each period 
  Corporate tax rate of 25 per cent 
  Two situations: 1) allowances are all sold ultimo period 2, 2) allowances are used 
to meet obligations in period 2 
 
The opening value of the allowances is 100 €. During period 0, the price increases to 15 € 
per allowance, hence total value increases to 150 €, which will be the closing value at the end 
of period 0. The book value of the allowances has increased by 50 €, equal to the difference 
between the opening and closing value, cf. Table 4.7. 
 
If tax treatment of allowances is done according to the inventory principle, the gain in value 
of 50 € will be added to taxable income, leaving the tax payment at 12.5 €. If tax treatment   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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of allowances is done according to the realisation principle there will be no income to tax as 
gains not realised will not be added to taxable income. 
 
Table 4.7 Timing of taxation differ between market value and realisation principle 
      Allowances are sold 
Allowances  are  used  for 
compliance 
(€ )  Period 0  Period 1  Period 2 
Sum of tax 
payment 
Period 2 
Sum of tax 
payment 
Opening value   100  150  170  -  170  - 
Closing value   150  170  160  -  160  - 
Change in value   50  20  (10)  -  (10)  - 
Assessable income / (deductable expense)           
Inventory (Market value)   50  20  (10)  -  (10)  - 
Realisation   0  0  60  -  (100)  - 
Income tax – 25 %             
Inventory (Market value)   12.5  5  (2.5)  15  (2.5)  15 
Realisation   0  0  15  15  -  15 
 
In period 1, the price of allowances increases to 17 € with total value increased to 170 €. The 
story repeat itself, hence tax treatment according to the inventory principle cause a payment 
of 5 €.  
 
In period 2 the price decreases to 16 €. As the total value decreases to 160 € the change in 
opening and closing value is 10 €, thus allowing a deduction of 10 € if tax treatment is ac-
cording to the inventory principle. Tax treatment according to the inventory principle is 
based on the change in value of the allowances. Hence, it does not matter whether they are 
sold or used for compliance in period 2. Therefore, the company will save 2.5 € in income 
tax payment equal to the tax value of the deduction.  
 
If the allowances are treated according to the realisation principle, the gain from selling the 
allowances in period 2 is equal to the difference in the historical purchase cost at 100 € and 
the revenue from selling them at 160 €. This will add 60 € to taxable income related to pe-
riod 2, hence that tax payment will be equal to 15 €. If allowances are treated according to 
the inventory principle, total payment of taxes will also be 15 €, but timing will differ as gain 
and loss related to every period will be added to taxable income in each period. In period 0, 
tax payment will be 12.5 €, period 1 it will be 5 € and at the end of period 2 it will be -2.5 
€, leaving the sum of tax payments at 15 €. 
 
If allowances are used for compliance, the picture will change marginally when tax treatment 
is done according to the realisation principle. As the allowances are not sold, there will be no 
direct income to tax. However, we might expect a total tax payment of 15 € anyway; using 
the allowance as an ‘input’ into a production process, the company will at least add 160 € to 
the total revenue from selling the output (e.g. electricity), compared to a situation without   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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ETS. Otherwise, the company will be better off by supplying the allowances in the allowance 
market. Thus, revenue from selling the output is 160 € and income is 160 € - 100 € = 60 €, 
leaving the tax payment at 60 € x 25 per cent = 15 €. 
 
So the basic difference between the inventory and the realisation principles is the timing of 
taxation. The amount of taxes paid is equal. According to the inventory principle, changes in 
the value of allowances will be added to/deducted from taxable income at the end of each 
period.  According  to  the  realisation  principle,  changes  in  value  will  only  be  added 
to/deducted from taxable income in the period where the allowances are sold/used.  
 
However, even though we might expect that total tax payment is equal to both inventory 
and realisation taxation, the NPV of the tax payments differs. This is due to the difference in 
timing of payments. This issue is the same as our discussion regarding recognition in terms 
of tax treatment in Issue 1, but with the difference that Issue 1 is about NPV of tax value of 
costs whereas Issue 2 is about NPV of tax payments. Yet, to the degree that the market price 
of allowances stays more or less constant with only minor variations there will be only mod-
est tax payments throughout time when applying the inventory principle. Hence, the inven-
tory principle will de facto be ‘turned into’ the realisation principle. 
 
We do not expect the issue of taxation principle to become significant; partly due to the fact 
that nearly all countries follow the realisations principle, partly due to the possibility of stor-
age of allowances.  
Issue 3: Taxation of free allowances 
For the post 2012 system, a number of sectors – energy intensive and leakage exposed com-
panies – will receive allowances free of charge. According to the study be Deloitte, the ma-
jority of the reporting countries reported that the initial allocation free of charge does not 
constitute taxable income at the time of allocation in form of a grant, subsidy, extraordinary 
income etc.  However, as shown above three countries tax allowances when they are received 
even if not used in the same year. 
 
Such differences between countries in the tax treatment of free allowances may potentially 
affect the pattern of investments in new capacity and of ceasing operations, thereby leading 
to distortions.  The size of the distortions depends on the joint results of two elements:   
  To what extent will changes in the location of the production of, and investment 
in, the economic activity that leads to CO2 emissions affect the future allocation of 
free allowances? 
  How large is the net tax benefit related to the tax treatment of free allowance from 
such a move of location of the economic activity? 
 
Moving the production can be done in different fashions; either by closing an installation in 
one country and building a new installation in another country or, less drastically, by stop-  ETS ALLOWANCES 
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ping investments and maintenance in existing installations and instead building capacity in 
another country. If an installation is closed and a new one is built, no more allowances 
would be issued for the closed installation. If e.g. avoided maintenance leads to a signifi-
cantly reduced production capacity, the number of free allowances would also be reduced, 
subject to rules to be adopted by the European Commission by the end of 2010. Otherwise, 
incentives to substitute existing capacity with new capacity are magnified since it would lead 
to allocation of more free allowances.  
    
Therefore, significant extensions of production capacity will be allowed additional free al-
lowances and, in parallel, free allowances will be discontinued for installations that partly or 
fully cease their operations. 
 
To be able to allow additional free allowances to capacity increases and new entrants a buffer 
of allowances will be established
23; 5 per cent of Community-wide allowances for 2013-2020 
are put away for new entrants
24. However the definitions of ‘significant extensions’ and ‘new 
entrants’ are not yet clarified. These definitions and the implementation measures for the 




As this study is about tax issues, not design of the ETS system per se, we will restrict our-
selves to a more narrow evaluation. Essentially, we suggest that distortions that result from 
different regimes for taxing free allowance hinge on the provisions on updating. If firms can 
receive free allowances when adding to or moving capacity to countries with favourable taxa-
tion of allowances, then they will have a tax incentive to relocate emission generating activi-
ties within the EU in the direction of such jurisdictions.   
 
The exact provisions relating to definitions of what constitutes significant reductions (but 
not closure) as well as significant expansion of capacity is still under discussion. But we un-
derline that resulting distortions are  likely to be minor as they are essentially again linked to 
the issue of storage. There is only an effective difference in the level of taxation between the 
two set of tax systems described above to the extent that allocated free allowances exceed sys-
tematically the “needed” level for the industries concerned, providing a benefit to the indus-
tries located in the countries where there only taxed when used.  In the section 4.2 below we 
have for illustrative purposes analysed the effect where the size of over allocation relate to ac-
tual use in the same year is set to 5 per cent. 
 
 
                                                        
23 EC (2009),  Directive 2009/29/EC, Article 10a, paragraph 7 
24 The concept of ‘New entrants’ is to be defined by Dec 31, 2010 
25 EC (2009),  Directive 2009/29/EC, Article 1   ETS ALLOWANCES 
  44 
4.2.  CALCULATED WELFARE LOSSES DUE TO DIFFERENCES IN NATIONAL TAXA-
TION  
This section demonstrates that actual distortions from differences in tax treatments of allow-
ances are quite limited. The basis for this conclusion is drawn from a modelling exercise of 
the EU27 abatement efforts. As demonstrated above, the real economic loss of different tax 
treatments arises as firms perceive abatement costs to be higher in a country with favourable 
tax treatment of allowances and therefore move abatement away from this country. The op-
posite holds when tax treatments are more unfavourable in a specific country than the aver-
age. 
 
The cost of abatement displacement will most importantly depend on the degree of differen-
tial tax treatment. As we show below (see appendix), the actual degree of differentiability is 
so small that it hardly creates any economic effects. The reason is that despite significant 
formal differences in accounting principles, the actual end-of-the-year tax differences are 
negligible. Being allowed to depreciate or deduct at time of purchase or at time of use only 
generates differences from a net present value perspective. 
  
In Table 4.8 we show the absolute value of the loss as calculated by our abatement model in 
terms of additional abatement costs of having non-uniform tax regimes across EU Member 
States. The table lists four different scenarios implying cost increases in the range 0.01-0.02 
per cent (0.6-2.5 million €) on an annual basis from 2020 and onwards. In the years towards 
2020, the €-value of the loss will generally be smaller since abatement is smaller. The model 
is based on reasonable abatement curve estimates for the last and most expensive year in the 
ETS Phase III, i.e. 2020, together with reasonable discount rates of 5 per cent per annum for 
the calculation of net present value effects.
26 Most importantly, the model quantifies the dif-
ferential tax treatment of allowances so that we can estimate after-tax marginal abatement 
costs for each Member State.  The model calculates a first-best outcome with uniform tax 
treatment in order to benchmark the outcome with actual differential treatment. 
 
Table 4.8: Additional annual abatement costs from tax distortions  
  Biannual purchase  Full up-front purchase 
20 per cent target 
 
 0.011 % 
(0.6 million €) 
0.021 % 
(1.2 million €) 
30 per cent target  0.011 % 
(1.4 million €) 
0.021 % 
(2.5 million €) 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics 
 
The four different scenarios are built around two fundamental market design choices: the 
reduction target in 2020 (20 or 30 per cent), and the possibility of acquiring allowances for 
the entire period up front or on a biannual basis. 
 
                                                        
26 Furthermore, the model assumes a uniform EU-wide corporate tax rate in order to ‘purify’ the treatment effect.   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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The current target is 20 per cent overall GHG emission reductions by 2020 compared to 
1990 levels. However, there have recently been advocates for an even more ambitious target 
of 30 per cent reductions in 2020. The second dimension concerns the possibility to either 
acquire  allowances  immediately  or  on  a  year-by-year  basis with  limited  storage  between 
years. Since the distortion effects mainly arise due to net present value considerations of 
stored allowances, the full up-front purchase possibility will generate the largest distortion ef-
fects. The full up-front purchase possibility is not necessarily a realistic option given current 
ETS legislation but it allows us to calculate an upper bound on the distortion effects. Thus, 
we may be quite confident (given other modelling uncertainties) in claiming that the EU-
wide economic distortion does not exceed 0.021 per cent or 2.5 million €, which is obvi-
ously a very small figure. 
 
To get a feeling of the absolute numbers of the ETS abatement and distortion losses, we 
consider back-of-the-envelope calculations built around Figure 4.1 below. The first relevant 
number (not shown in the figure below) is current EU-wide emissions, which amounts to 
app. 2,000 million tonnes CO2 in the ETS sectors.
27 A reduction of 20 per cent, therefore, 
means abatement of app. 400 million tonnes CO2. Different studies suggest a carbon price 
of around 30 €/tonne CO2 for this abatement level.
28 The calibration of our own cost-
abatement model suggests a carbon price of 28 €/tonne CO2, which is fairly close to the 
findings from other studies. In total, we would therefore see a turnover of allowances of 
around 12 billion € (30 €/tonne * 400 million tonnes). This amount is illustrated as the rec-
tangle ABCD. The actual abatement costs only amounts to the area below the marginal 
abatement cost curve, i.e., the triangle ACD.
29 The standard geometry rule on calculating 
triangle areas would suggest a total abatement cost of no more than 6 billion €. In fact, our 
empirical model returns the figure 5.5 billion €, capturing the fact that the curve AC is not a 
straight line, but slightly downward bending. 
 
                                                        
27 See e.g. the CITL database. 
28 EC (2008) and OECD (2009a) 
29 Formally, total abatement cost equals the integral of marginal abatement costs.   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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Figure 4.1 Total EU-wide abatement 
 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics 
 
In order to provide a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the distortion loss, we need an esti-
mate of how much current tax treatments lead to differences in perceived and actual costs. 
Already knowing that the only difference in tax effect is related to net present value consid-
erations, we are not surprised to learn that perceived and actual allowance (abatement) costs 
do not differ by more than app. 2 per cent (much more on this issue below.) With a mar-
ginal abatement cost elasticity of app. 1, this 2 per cent difference in perceived prices leads to 
app. 2 per cent difference in actual abatement. Again remembering the triangle rule, we 
therefore arrive at a loss of approximately: 
 
2 per cent * 2 per cent / 2 = 0.02 per cent, 
 
which is extremely close to the model implied percentage loss of 0.021 per cent. Moreover, 
0.02 per cent of 6 billion € equals 1.2 million €, this time exactly on spot with regard to the 
model estimate. 
 
4.3.  EUA’S: POTENTIALS FOR TAX ARBITRAGE OR DOUBLE TAXATION 
 
Regarding tax arbitrage due to tax planning by companies with affiliates in two or more EU 
MS, we cannot see a major risk for this becoming significant. In order to adapt this conclu-
sion, we can imagine a company with affiliates (power plants) in two countries (C1 and C2), 
which differ in terms of tax treatment. The ‘intuitive’ economic benefit for the company 
could be a result of transfer (trade) allowances to affiliates in C2 that practises an immediate 
deduction of costs in tax base from C1, which practises time-of-use deductions. However, 
Abatement, 
mio tonnes CO2
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we do not expect this ‘traffic’ to take place – at least not regarding EUA’s or secondary 
CER´s – as we only see a limited potential benefit for the companies. This is due to two rea-
sons: 
 
First, the affiliate in the exporting country C1 would be short of allowances; hence the com-
pany would not be able to meet compliance or may decrease the activity. If the affiliate in 
C1 does not need the allowances for compliance but has only purchased them for the pur-
pose of arbitrage possibilities, the importing affiliate in C2 could have purchased allowances 
in the first place instead of ‘taken a detour’ around C1. A slight variation of this could be 
that  the  C1-affiliate  purchased  allowances,  actually  believing  that  the  allowances  were 
needed, but due to a decrease in power prices generation decreased. If the C1-affiliate then 
hands over the allowances to the C2-affiliate where power prices are higher, it will be a 
transaction just in line with efficient allocation of allowances and has nothing to do with ar-
bitrage. 
 
Second, we do not see transfer pricing in order to ‘manage the tax base’ as an issue; the price 
of allowances is fully transparent and nearly equal all over Europe.  A company may have the 
intention to shift the tax base to a country with favourable deduction possibilities by trading 
allowances at artificial (high) prices, but this can easily be revealed by authorities as the true 
market price is definitely observable.  
 
These argument may also hold for secondary CER’s, secondary CER’s are quite analogue to 
EUA’s in terms of CO2 abatement and transparency of market price. 
 
4.4.  CDM AND JI: TAX PLANNING AND DOUBLE TAXATION 
In terms of CDM and JI, we distinguish between direct engagement in CDM and JI projects 
and trade of credits, where the former is project development/investment phase up to the 
point before the investment starts to generate secondary CER’s/ERU’s; that is up to the 
point where e.g. the United Nations’ CDM Executive Board is to commence to issue CER 
credits. The later is with regard to trade of secondary CER’s. We treat both phases in turn 
below. In this chapter, we finally raise some issues regarding opportunities for tax planning. 
Direct engagement in CDM and JI projects 
When we focus on abatement projects like CDM and JI’s with regard to the development 
phase we have identified three issues one have to clarify, hence this might turn into real 
problems in terms of tax treatment. 
 
First, the domestic tax treatment with respect to projects expenses and grant of emissions 
credits are not clear.  
   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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Domestic tax treatment of projects expenses: Before an allowance originated as CDM or JI 
becomes eligible for the EU ETS, an investor has to carry out a CDM or JI project generat-
ing emission credits. Most investors incur expenses before a project returns a benefit in terms 
of emission credits. Such expenses are associated with the certification process, including 
those incurred during the process of qualifying the project as well as those during the opera-
tional phase of the project. The tax treatment of such expenses depends on domestic tax law 
of each country, and in general two of the following alternatives exist. Under the first alter-
native, the expenses are treated as the acquisition costs of the emission credits, whereas under 
the second alternative the expenses are treated as operating costs. And further, each of the al-
ternatives is subject to variations. 
 
Under the first alternative, the expenses are treated as the acquisition costs of the emission 
credits. It is uncertain, whether tax deduction/depreciation will be allowed by the national 
tax authorities where no emission credits are granted.  
 
Under the second alternative, the expenses are treated as operating costs. The possibility of 
deduction of expenses under this alternative is generally less dependent on whether the emis-
sion credits are actually granted or not.  
 
Grant of emissions credits: By carrying out the projected abatement level, emission credits 
may be granted by e.g. United Nations’ CDM Executive Board. Whether the grant of emis-
sion credits is regarded as taxable income or tax free also depends on domestic tax legislation. 
However, it seems reasonable to assume that where the first alternative (acquisition costs) 
applies, the emission credits are considered to be acquired for the expenses and therefore no 
(further) tax consequences arise. If, on the other hand, the second alternative (operating 
costs) applies, it is more uncertain whether the emission credits are considered as a taxable or 
tax free income.  
 
The combination of applying the second alternative and where granted credits are consid-
ered as a taxable income, the consequence might be double taxation if instead a company al-
ternatively purchased EUA’s for compliance. Why is it so? By using granted credits, the op-
erating costs can be deducted against taxable income, but the value of credits is added to tax-
able income. In this way the company will not get a deduction in real as in addition to a de-
duction the value of the CERs are added to taxable income. If instead the company use 
EUA’s, the purchase cost can be deducted against income, hence the total costs are lower as 
no grants are added to taxable income. 
 
Moreover, participation through a carbon fund or ‘trust’ may complicate this further. In 
some jurisdictions such funds are transparent for tax purposes, i.e. despite that the funds 
may be legal persons for company law purposes (e.g. legal owners of the granted emission 
credits and expenses etc.) the funds are not separate tax subjects. In other jurisdictions, these 
funds may be categorised as corporations or the like, i.e. subject to tax. If the qualification of   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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the fund or ‘trust’ differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, this may result in double taxation 
or double non-taxation. 
 
Second, the perception whether the engagement in CDM or JI projects may constitute a 
permanent establishment may differ between national tax authorities. The determination of 
a ‘permanent establishment’ is important in terms of taxation. 
 
Participation in CDM or JI projects often involves cross-border transactions as projects often 
are located in a host state different than the participants’ state of residence. Consequently, it 
is relevant to determine, which of the jurisdictions – the host state (State of source) or the 
State of resident – is allocated the right to tax. 
 
Tax treaties are bilateral conventions entered into by two jurisdictions to avoid international 
double taxation of income and capital. The risk of double taxation occurs as the vast major-
ity of States levy tax on resident taxpayers on a worldwide basis, i.e. the taxable income in-
cludes both domestic and cross-border transactions profits. In order to prevent international 
double taxation, tax treaties establishes two categories of rules according to which the right 
to tax is allocated to one of the two contracting states. The first category of rules determine 
the respective rights to tax of the State of source and the State of residence with respect to 
different classes of income and capital. The second category of rules determines that the 
State of residence must allow a relief for double taxation if the State of source is allocated a 
full or limited right to tax. 
 
The OECD Model Tax Convention constitutes the basis of most of the tax treaties. Thus, in 
respect to the interpretation of a specific tax treaty, the OECD Model Tax Convention and 
the Commentary thereon is normally applied. Therefore, we will only refer to the OECD 
Model Tax Convention in the following
30. 
 
In this context it seems relevant
31 to determine whether the engagement in CDM or JI pro-
jects may constitute a permanent establishment. Hence, it follows from the OECD Model 
Tax Convention that the State of source only has the right to tax business profits (attribut-
able to the CDM or JI project) if a permanent establishment is established






                                                        
30 Please refer to appendix for more on the OECD Model Tax Convention. 
31It is also relevant to discuss whether Article 7 on Business Profit, Article 13 on Capital Gains and Article 21 on 
Other Income applies. As the scope of these Articles are outlined in the third version of our report “Study 
on the Tax Treatment of EU Allowances – The Issues of Corporate Income Taxation” it is left out of this 
memorandum. 
32See Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International (2009)   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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 Box 4.1  Article 5 of the OECD Model Tax convention 
The wording of Article 5 of the OECD Model Tax convention is as follows: (our highlight) 
 
1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘permanent establishment’ means a fixed 
place of business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly car-
ried on. 
 
2. The term ‘permanent establishment’ includes especially: 
a)  a place of management; 
b)   a branch; 
c)  an office; 
d) a factory; 
e)  a workshop, and 
f)  a mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place of extraction of natural re-
sources. 
 
3. A building site or construction or installation project constitutes a permanent estab-
lishment only if it lasts more than twelve months. 
 
4. Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this Article, the term ‘permanent estab-
lishment’ shall be deemed not to include: 
a)  the use of facilities solely for the purpose of storage, display or delivery of goods 
or merchandise belonging to the enterprise; 
b)  the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise 
solely for the purpose of storage, display or delivery; 
c)   the maintenance of a stock of goods or merchandise belonging to the enterprise 
solely for the purpose of processing by another enterprise; 
d)  the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of purchasing 
goods or merchandise or of collecting information, for the enterprise; 
e) the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for the purpose of carry-
ing on, for the enterprise,  any other activity of  a preparatory or  auxiliary 
character; 
f)  the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for any combination of activi-
ties mentioned in subparagraphs a) to e), provided that the overall activity of the 
fixed place of business resulting from this combination is of a preparatory or aux-
iliary character. 
 
5. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, where a person — other than an 
agent of an independent status to whom paragraph 6 applies — is acting on behalf of an 
enterprise and has, and habitually exercises, in a Contracting State an authority to con-
clude contracts in the name of the enterprise, that enterprise shall be deemed to have a 
permanent establishment in that State in respect of any activities which that person un-
dertakes for the enterprise, unless the activities of such person are limited to those men-
tioned in paragraph 4 which, if exercised through a fixed place of business, would not 
make this fixed place of business a permanent establishment under the provisions of that 
paragraph. 
 
6. An enterprise shall not be deemed to have a permanent establishment in a Contracting 
State merely because it carries on business in that State through a broker, general com-
mission agent or any other agent of an independent status, provided that such persons 
are acting in the ordinary course of their business. 
 
7. The fact that a company which is a resident of a Contracting State controls or is con-
trolled by a company which is a resident of the other Contracting State, or which carries on 
business in that other State (whether through a permanent establishment or otherwise), 
shall not of itself constitute either company a permanent establishment of the other. 
 
Source:  Deloitte (2010a) 
 
Whether the State of source is entitled to levy tax on the CDM and JI project or not thus 
depends  on  the  specific  tax  treaties  and/or  domestic  tax  legislation. It follows from the 
above, that the term ‘permanent establishment’ means a fixed place of business through   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried out. Thus, in order to consti-
tute a permanent establishment, the place of business must serve a foreign taxpayer’s business 
activity as opposed to other income-generating activities, i.e. the mere presence in a country 
is not sufficient. Consequently, for the engagement in a CDM or JI project to constitute a 
permanent establishment, it is a requirement that the project results in a fixed place of busi-
ness through which the business of the participant is wholly or partly carried on. And if such 
a fixed place of business is considered for constituted none of the exceptions in Article 5 may 
apply, e.g. sec.4 f) according to which, the maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for 
the purpose of carrying on, for the enterprise, any other activity of a preparatory or auxiliary 
character is not included in the term ‘permanent establishment’. 
 
The analysis of whether a specific participant’s engagement in a CDM or JI project consti-
tutes a permanent establishment must be made for each concrete case, i.e. no general conclu-
sion can be made in this regard. However, it seems reasonable to assume that a financial in-
vestor participating for the purpose of profit from sale of emission credits is more likely to be 
deemed to have a permanent establishment than a corporation subject to the EU ETS. Con-
sequently, the result may depend on whether the participant is subject to the EU ETS and 
participate in the project with the purpose of acquiring emission credits for the use of com-
pliance or whether the participants engage to the project for the purpose of profit from sale 
of the acquired emission credits. 
 
If the States in question do not interpret the term ‘permanent establishment’ uniformly, it 
might result in double taxation as a consequence of different qualification, e.g. in the State 
of source the participation in CDM’s or JI’s is considered as constituting a permanent estab-
lishment and consequently the State of source is allocated the right to tax and in the State of 
residence the exact same participation is not considered as constituting a permanent estab-
lishment and consequently the State of residence is allocated the right to tax. 
 
Third, as no clear market price exits on projects or with regard to CDM projects, the so-
called primary CER, hence transfer pricing might be an issue.  
 
The transfer of technology, know-how and services between associated enterprises in the 
context of CDM and JI projects will be subject to the transfer pricing legislation of the 
countries involved.  The  transactions  must  thus  be  valued  in  accordance with  the  arm’s 
length principle, which is the cornerstone of the international transfer pricing regime. 
 
In terms of transfers between 1) head offices and foreign permanent establishments, 2) per-
manent establishment in different Member States and 3) intra-group companies, consistency 
seems to appear as the arm’s length principle and the domestic transfer pricing regime apply 
in all three situations in the following countries: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Cy-
prus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ire-
land,  Italy,  Latvia,  Liechtenstein,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg  (intra-group  transactions),  the   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
 
Some  of  the  reporting  countries  (Austria,  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  Denmark, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slove-
nia, Spain and the United Kingdom) have further reported that the domestic transfer pricing 
legislation generally is interpreted in accordance with Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention. 
 
Three of the reporting countries reported that even though the arm’s length principle in fact 
applies, no specific transfer pricing legislation has been enacted (Ireland (formalized arm’s 
length principle for intra-group trading transactions, has effect as of 1 January 2011), Latvia 
and Malta). Further it is reported that under Bulgarian and Maltese tax law, transfer between 
head office and foreign permanent establishments is not considered a transfer for tax pur-
poses, since permanent establishments do not constitute separate legal entities. However, the 
arm’s length principle applies in regard to intra-group transactions. 
 
No guidelines on valuation of such mechanisms according to Article 9 of the OECD Model 
Tax Convention are made. Consequently, the valuation must be made in accordance with 
the general interpretation of the arm’s length principle. The challenges and the uncertainties 
that may occur during the estimation of conditions that does not differ from those, which 
would have been made between independent enterprises, are not an issue occurring only in 
relation to CDM or JI projects. On the contrary, it is a general issue that often occurs when 
valuating unique or rare types of transactions for transfer pricing purposes. 
Trade of credits (secondary CER´s) 
This section deals with some of the tax implications that occur in relation to the general 
transactions involving the trade of credits. With regard to secondary CER’s, we do not see 
any significant potential for tax arbitrage via transfer pricing as CER’s are traded daily with 
clear and public market prices, cf. chapter 2.2. 
 
However, regarding the qualification of emission credits for tax purposes there might be an 
issue. The qualification of emission credits is sufficient in relation to the determination of 
the tax treatment of sale and purchase of such. It follows from the comparative analysis re-
ported in Deloitte (2010) “Study on the Tax Treatment of EU Allowances – The Issues of 
Corporate Income Tax” that the majority of the reporting countries have addressed that the 
qualification of emission credits for tax purposes is not yet clarified. As a best guess, it is re-
ported that emission credits are expected to be treated similar to EUA’s as outlined in our 
report referred to above. 
 
However, Belgium has reported that the credits issued from CDM or JI projects are to be 
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investment to the extent that the conversion into emission credit is a mere formality or a 
market price is available for these types of credits. 
 
In Denmark, two opposing opinions have been presented in legal theory: (1) credits should 
be treated similar to emission allowances and (2) credits should be considered a financial in-
strument/derivative and subject to specific tax provisions regarding such financial instru-
ments. 
 
Generally, all of the reporting countries reported that as a best guess the taxation of emission 
credits from CDM and JI projects is expected to be similar to the tax treatment of EUA’s. As 
a consequence of the uncertainty regarding the qualification of EUA’s, the tax effects from 
purchase or creation of emission credits issued from CDM’s and JI’s are of a similar –or even 
more - uncertain nature. 
Observations on tax planning opportunities 
The possibility of arbitrage occurs due to inconsistent qualification and/or tax treatment of 
the income/gain in question in the relevant jurisdictions. As the qualification and tax treat-
ment of participation in CDM and JI projects as well as the qualification and tax treatment 
of emission credits are subject to great uncertainties, several arbitrage opportunities may ex-
ist. However, it should also be noted that great uncertainties may prevent tax planning due 
to the lack of due process and may further result in double taxation and the avoidance of 
participating in CDM or JI projects. 
 
Such potential tax planning opportunities can be divided into two main categories: (1) plan-
ning opportunities that occur due to inconsistent qualification and/or tax treatment of emis-
sion credits and participation in CDM/JI projects and (2) planning opportunities of more 
general character that also occur in relation to emission credits and CDM/JI projects. Below 
we have provided examples of both categories. 
 
Examples of category 1 opportunities: 
  Double non-taxation as a consequence of different interpretation of the term ‘perma-
nent establishment. The possibility of inconsistent interpretation of the term ‘perma-
nent establishment’ especially occurs in respect to CDM and JI projects as these pro-
jects differ significantly from other types of projects. CDM and JI projects are unique 
as these projects only has a potential value due to legislation on the requirement of sur-
render  of  EUA’s  combined  with  the  possibility  of  generation  of  emission  credits 
(CER’s and ERU’s). 
  Double non-taxation as a consequence of different tax characterisations and tax treat-
ments with respect to domestic tax legislation and/or different qualification pursuant to 
tax treaties. This issue is relevant with respect to the qualification and tax treatment of 
the emission credits, i.e. tax treatment of the grant hereof, trading and used to offset 
emissions in the EU ETS. However, this issue is also relevant with respect to the tax 
treatment of expenses incurred in relation to the CDM/JI project, including the tax   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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treatment of expenses incurred in the beginning of the project phase, i.e. before the 
project returns a benefit in terms of emission credits, expenses associated with the certi-
fication process as well as expenses incurred during the operational phase of the project. 
  Utilisation of the different characterisations in the various jurisdictions with respect to 
treating engagement in CDM or JI projects as acquisition of an asset (emission credit) 
that may be reported in the balance sheet and amortised/depreciated versus treating 
engagement in CDM/JI projects as a deductible expense. Although this difference may 
only be of a temporary nature, it could have a significant impact on cash flows of mul-
tinational groups. 
  Utilisation of the different characterisations in the various jurisdictions with respect to 
treating emission credits as assets that may be reported in the balance sheet and amor-
tised/depreciated versus treating emission credits as a deductible expenses. Although 
this difference may only be of a temporary nature, it could have a significant impact on 
cash flows of multinational groups. 
 
Examples of category 2 opportunities: 
  Centralising the possession of the group’s participation in CDM or JI projects in one 
group company, which could serve as an intra-group ‘creation centre’. If the group ex-
pects the creation centre to be profitable, it could be placed in a low tax jurisdiction or 
in an affiliated company with tax losses carried forward. If instead the creation centre is 
expected to be loss-making, it could be located in a profit-making affiliated company 
in a high tax jurisdiction.  
  Centralising the possession of a groups knowhow, e.g. abatement technology in one 
group company, which could serve as an intra-group ‘knowhow centre’. And as above, 
if the group expects the knowhow centre to be profitable, it could be placed in a low 
tax jurisdiction or in an affiliated company with tax losses carried forward. If instead 
the knowhow centre is expected to be loss-making, it could be located in a profit mak-
ing affiliated company in a high tax jurisdiction.  
  Generally, in respect to intergroup transactions the opportunity of tax planning occurs. 
Consequently, transfer pricing legislation is likely to apply in relation to such inter-
group transactions.  This scenario involves generally certain issues for tax purposes, e.g. 
estimation of an arm’s length value/price. Such issues also occur in relation to CDM/JI 
projects, particularly in the case of transfer of knowhow or the like and in situations 
where the ownership of projects is transferred. In this respect, it should be noted that 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines do not contain any guidelines on the estima-
tion of appropriate transfer prices in the context of CDM/JI projects. 
 
From the analysis above the most important issue is with regard to inconsistent qualification 
and/or tax treatment of CDM/JI both in terms of cost incurred in the project phase, but also 
with respect to trade of secondary CER´s. The inconsistence may cause double non-taxation, 
double taxation and/or inefficiencies in terms of GHG abatement.  
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We have identified a number of potential problems in the current regime for taxation of  
EUA’s and other market based climate policy instruments that may reduce their efficiency in 
abating emissions and/or create opportunities for tax arbitrage and/risk of double taxation.  
Chapter 5 discuss some possible solutions. Section 5.1 offers our summary of best practice 
for taxation at the national level. Section 5.2 reviews whether inclusion of ETS in a possible 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax base might be helpful. Section 5.3 reviews the inter-
action of the ETS with the EUs directive on Interest and Royalties. Finally, we summarise 
our overall policy recommendations in section 5.4.  
 
5.1.  BEST PRACTICE SOLUTIONS 
 
We have defined four questions that are crucial when reviewing the functioning of tax sys-
tems vis-à-vis ETS and put forward our recommendations for best practice. 
 
First, should allowances be categorised in national tax systems as (1) a commodity, (2) an in-
tangible asset or (3) a financial asset, this being the three standard possible options? We ar-
gue generally that treatment as a commodity is the most natural solution and creates the least 
problems of implementation. We have to bear in mind that allowances are mainly aimed at 
fossil fired power plants or other huge consumers of fossil energy. These companies view al-
lowances complimentary to other inputs into the productions process, hence different tax 
treatment of complimentary commodities are basically not preferential. Essentially, the pur-
pose of these flexible instruments is to create a new trade ‘commodity’ with a common price 
within the EU, namely emissions of GHG, which is to be treated as any other operational 
expense.  
 
Second, should firms be allowed to deduct their purchase costs for tax purpose (1) in the 
year when it is purchased or (2) when used to comply with ETS obligations? We argue that 
the best solution would be to deduct it when it is used. If the allowance is bought and ‘used’ 
within the same tax year, the distinction makes no difference. However, ETS allowances can 
be stored: if not used in year 1, they can be transferred for use in the subsequent years. In-
herently, ETS allowances are not exposed to ‘wear and tear’, hence there are no costs associ-
ated with buying an allowance used for future compliance (besides financing costs plus risk 
of price changes). Indeed, this is a main argument against treating it as an intangible asset, 
an asset type that is typically allowed a linear depreciation of its value over its life time.  
 
Third, should capital gains and losses on allowances be taxed when (1) realised or (2) when 
they accrue? Our verdict is more open here. Most analyses on tax systems are favourable to 
accrual based taxation as deferred taxation typically increases risk of non-compliance and tax 
arbitrage. Standard arguments against are adverse cash-flow consequences for firms (taxes 
have to be paid despite no incoming cash from sale) and uncertainty about the real market 
price of the asset/commodity. While the latter argument clearly does not apply to ETS al-
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lowances  that  are  traded  on  a  real-time basis, the cash-flow  problem could  be  an  issue. 
Moreover, the tax systems in place in the EU uniformly use realisation principles for sales of 
other operational assets and commodities, so we would propose this principle also here. 
 
Fourth, how should free allowances be taxed? Our focus is on the post 2012 regime where 
the allocation of free allowances are increasingly being restricted to energy intensive indus-
tries in international competition, i.e. the enterprises that are most likely to react to tax in-
duced distortions from the ETS. There are essentially two options on the table: (1) taxed 
when received and deducted for tax purposed when used or (2) un-taxed when received but 
also no right of deduction when used. If received and used in same fiscal tax year, there is no 
difference from a cash-flow perspective. However, if the allowance is stored for use in later 
years, the non-tax system is preferential for the receiving companies as there is no up-front 
taxation, where option 1 is more in line with tax theory, hence all kind of benefits should be 
added to taxable income . Again, referring to the previous section, we argue in favour of ac-
crual based taxation. 
 
Summing up best practice, we would recommend the following: 
 
  Treatment of allowances: commodity 
  Depreciation: none should be allowed (no ‘wear and tear’) 
  Time of deduction for auctioned allowances: when used 
  Taxation of gains/losses: for consistency with rest of tax system, realisation 
  Free allowances: more  open  discussion  but  preference  for  solution  “not  tax re-
ceived, no later deduction when used” 
5.2.  INCLUSION  OF ETS  IN  A  POSSIBLE COMMON  CONSOLIDATED  CORPORATE 
TAX BASE 
The most ‘prominent’  problem identified  by  the Deloitte study  is  the  difference  in  tax 
treatment by the national states. However, as indicated both by the numerical examples and 
the modelling of abatement curves in the previous chapter, this problem currently seems to 
be of modest character and may never become severe.  
The idea behind the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax base (CCCTB) 
Companies operating within the EU currently have to deal with up to 27 different and often 
overlapping tax systems. The complexity caused by this patchwork of national tax systems 
entails tax uncertainty, double taxation as well as compliance costs. To mitigate these prob-
lems, the European Commission has initiated the work towards creating a CCCTB. 
 
The core purpose of the CCCTB is to establish a single consolidated computation of taxable 
corporate income for businesses operating within the EU. The CCCTB will make it possible 
for businesses to opt for taxation according to one set of common rules instead of national 
rules.   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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If a group decides to opt for the CCCTB, the total consolidated tax base of the group – 
computed according to the CCCTB rules – should subsequently be shared among the EU 
Member States, in which the group has activities, in order for the Member States to be able 
to tax their share of the total consolidated tax base with the tax rate applicable in the Mem-
ber State. 
Computing the tax base as a whole and individual country shares 
Under the CCCTB the companies would be subject to corporate tax on their worldwide in-
come. The taxable income would be broadly defined to include income of any kind, whether 
monetary or non-monetary, including not only trading income but also proceeds from dis-
posal of assets and rights, interests, dividends and other profit distributions, subsidies and 
grants etc. 
 
Deductible expenses would mean all expenses incurred by the tax payer for business purposes 
in the production, maintenance or securing of income including costs of research and devel-
opment or in raising equity, or debt for business purposes. It is suggested that the definition 
of deductible expenses is accompanied by a list of non-deductible expenses.  
 
How to recognize an asset for tax purposes is, however, not completely clear under the 
CCCTB rules. A brief definition is set out, which defines tangible as well as intangible assets 
as “Resources held and controlled by an enterprise for use in the production or supply of 
goods and services, for rental to others or for administrative purposes which are expected to 
be used during more than one period”. Further, the circumstances under which property, 
plant and equipment should be recognized as tangible assets have been described as: “a) …it 
is probable that future economic benefit associated with the asset will flow to the enterprise; 
and b) the cost of the asset to the enterprise can be measured reliably.” These vague state-
ments/definitions have been subject to criticism.  
 
When the total consolidated tax base of the group has been computed according to the 
CCCTB rules, this tax base should be shared among the EU Member States, in which the 
group has activities in order for the Member States to be able to tax their share of the total 
tax base with the tax rate applicable in the Member State.  
The CCCTB as a possible means to harmonise the tax treatment of ETS allowances 
First of all, it would lead to difficulties/uncertainties if the tax treatment of ETS allowances 
should be deduced from the general CCCTB rules: 
 
  Concerning any initial allocation of ETS allowances free of charge, such an allo-
cation may in our view constitute taxable income, as gift/grants/subsidies are 
considered taxable income according to the CCCTB rules (unless a specific ex-
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  Further, the qualification of the ETS allowances – as intangible assets, inventory, 
financials assets etc. – could in itself prove to be difficult. In addition, it must be 
considered whether any purchase price paid for ETS Allowances acquired at auc-
tions should be capitalized and depreciated or instead deducted directly under 
the CCCTB. 
 
If,  however,  the  tax treatment  of ETS  Allowances is  addressed specifically  under  a  later 
CCCTB proposal, this could obviously resolve or reduce the difficulties/uncertainties with 
respect to the qualification and clarify how ETS allowances should be treated for tax pur-
poses (provided that businesses actually choose to opt for the CCCTB rules, and that a rea-
sonable amount of Member States decides to introduce the CCCTB rules). 
 
In general, some of the main benefits of the CCCTB are considered to arise from consolida-
tion, as this would allow loss consolidation among the affiliated companies of the group and 
free companies from compliance with intra-group transfer pricing rules. In this regard, it 
should, however, be kept in mind that transfer pricing issues are not particularly widespread 
when it comes to intra-group transfers of ETS allowances as the market price (arms length 
price) on ETS allowances across the EU is the same and transparent. In addition, it should 
be noted that only transfers between companies resident in Member States, which have 
adopted the CCCTB rules, would be freed from compliance with the transfer pricing rules, 
i.e. transfers involving affiliated companies in non-CCCTB Member States still have to ad-
here to the transfer pricing rules. 
 
Concerning emission credits generated by projects in the context of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) or Joint implementation (JI), the CCCTB could potentially help clarify 
how such emission credits should be classified and treated for tax purposes, e.g. with respect 
to the initial allocation, provided that a later CCCTB proposal in fact addresses these issues. 
However, as it is the case with the tax treatment of ETS allowances in general, the potential 
benefit  depends  on  whether businesses  actually  choose  to  opt  for  the  CCCTB  rules  or 
whether a reasonable amount of Member States decides to introduce the CCCTB rules. 
Optional use of the CCCTB 
When discussing whether the CCCTB is a possible means to harmonize the tax treatment of 
EUA’s, it is important to remember that under the proposed CCCTB system it is optional 
for  businesses  to  apply  the  CCCTB  rules.  As  a  consequence,  the  introduction  of  the 
CCCTB would not necessarily entail that all companies/groups involved with the EU ETS 
would end up being taxed according to the CCCTB rules. In fact, it is most likely that at 
least some companies/groups would prefer to continue to apply national tax legislations. 
Moreover, the subjective scope of the CCCTB and the ETS is not identical. 
Number of Member States joining the CCCTB 
The introduction of a CCCTB has been subject to heavy criticism by some Member States. 
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put forward by the European Commission during 2008. However, the Irish referendums on 
the Lisbon Treaty put the presentation of the directive proposal (temporarily) on hold, as the 
CCCTB turned out to be a sensitive issue during the Irish election campaign. The newly 
appointed Commissioner for Taxation and Customs, Audit and Anti-fraud – Algirdas Se-
meta – has, however, recently stated that he wishes the work on the CCCTB back on track.  
 
Despite the Commissioner’s intentions, it is in our view not likely that a CCCTB directive – 
applicable to all Member States – would be adopted in the near future as this requires una-
nimity and as some Member States strongly opposes the creation of a CCCTB. However, if 
at least one-third of the Member States are in favour of the CCCTB, these Member States 
can decide to move on with introducing the CCCTB through the ‘enhanced corporation 
procedure’. In that case, obviously, the CCCTB will only apply to the Member States in-
volved in the ‘enhanced corporation procedure’. This may further reduce the usefulness of 
the CCCTB as a means of harmonising the tax issues related to the ETS. 
 
In our view, several factors indicate that the CCCTB is not an expedient, fast and realistic 
means to harmonise the tax treatment of ETS allowances within the EU:  
 
  First, the CCCTB rules – in its current form – do not specifically address how 
ETS allowances should be treated. Accordingly, difficulties/uncertainty on the 
tax treatment could arise.  
 
  Second, the CCCTB is intended to be optional, i.e. not all companies involved 
in the EU ETS can be expected to opt for the application of the CCCTB. Thus, 
these companies would still be subject to the differential tax legislations in the 
jurisdictions in which they have activities. 
 
     Third, it is not realistic that CCCTB rules – applying to all Member States – 
will be adopted in the near future. 
 
Accordingly, relying on the CCCTB as a means to harmonise the tax treatment of ETS Al-
lowances within the EU could prove to be problematic. However, if the tax treatment of 
ETS allowances is addressed specifically under a later CCCTB proposal this could obviously 
resolve or reduce the difficulties/uncertainties with respect to the qualification and clarify 
how EUA’s should be treated for tax purposes, provided that businesses actually choose to 
opt for the CCCTB rules and that a reasonable amount of Member States decides to intro-
duce the CCCTB rules. 
 
In our view, facilitating the adoption of a directive specifically targeted at harmonising the 
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5.3.  INTERACTION OF THE EU ETS AND THE INTEREST AND ROYALTY DIRECTIVE 
In the previous chapter we discussed the risk of double taxation due to different interpreta-
tion of the provision of the OECD Tax Convention Model. We did not find evidence for 
risk of double taxation, although we cannot rule out that double taxation of cross-border 
transactions in the ETS market may occur. If transactions from allowance trading fall under 
The Interest and Royalty Directive, this may prevent double taxation. This paragraph ad-
dresses to what extent the Interest and Royalty Directive covers cross-border transactions 
under the EU ETS. 
 
We conclude that income derived from EU ETS allowances, CDM’s or JI’s are not covered 
by the notion of interests under the Directive since ETS allowances, CDM’s, and JI’s do not 
qualify as debt claims. Furthermore, it is submitted that payments for the use of or the right 
to use ETS allowances, CDM’s or JI’s are not covered by the notion of royalties for the pur-
pose of the Directive. 
Scope of the Interest and Royalty Directive 
According to the Interest and Royalty Directive, interest and royalty payments arisen in a 
Member State shall be relieved from any form of tax in the source state (i.e. no withholding 
taxes are levied) if the beneficial owner of the interest or royalty is a company or a permanent 
establishment resident in another Member State belonging to a company in a Member State. 
For the Interest and Royalties Directive to apply, both parties must qualify as a ‘company of 
a Member State’ as mentioned in the annex to the Interest and Royalty Directive, and being 
a taxable entity resident in a Member State. Another important requirement is the associa-
tion between the companies as defined in the Directive. A company is ‘associated’ with an-
other company if: 
 
  It directly holds at least 25 per cent of the other company's capital; or 
  The other company directly holds at least 25 per cent of its capital; or 
  A third company directly holds a share of at least 25 per cent of both its capital 
and the other company's capital. 
 
In conclusion, if these general requirements are met, interest and royalty payments between 
associated companies within the EU may avoid withholding taxation (but not income taxa-
tion). 
The notion of interest 
For the purpose of the Interest and Royalty Directive, the notion of interest is defined di-
rectly in the directive as 
 
The term ‘interest’ means income from debt claims of every kind, whether or not se-
cured by mort-gage and whether or not carrying a right to participate in the debtor's 
profits, and in particular, income from securities and income from bonds or debentures,   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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including premiums and prizes attaching to such securities, bonds or debentures; pen-
alty charges for late payment shall not be regarded as interest. 
The Interest and Royalty Directive 
 
As it appears from the definition, an interest is income from a debt claim. Thus, the essence 
is the interpretation of the notion of debt claims. The notion of debt claims seems broad as 
the wording refers to debt claims of any kind. It is our opinion that the broad interpretation 
of the notion of debt claim for tax purposes only includes loan of money, i.e. loan of assets 
are not covered by the notion of debt claims and consequently income from loan of assets 
does not qualify as interest covered by the Interest and Royalty Directive. However, this 
might be different if the loan itself is a debt claim, e.g. a loan of an interest bearing bond. As 
loan of ETS allowances, CDM’s and JI’s are loan of assets, it is hard to see that EU allow-
ances, CDM’s and JI’s should be covered by the Directive in its current form. The back-
ground for the interest definition is explained in COM (1998)67 where it is stated that:  
 
...The term ‘interest’ as used for the purposes of this Directive denotes in general all in-
come from debt-claims of every kind. The definition is based on that used in Article 11 
of the 1996 OECD Model Tax Convention on income and on capital, with the excep-
tion of income from government securities which is not relevant to this Directive. Pen-
alty charges for late payment do not really constitute income from capital, but are rather 
a special form of compensation for loss suffered through the debtor's delay in meeting 
his obligations. These charges are therefore, as in Article 11 of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention, not regarded as interest for the purposes of this Directive... 
COM (1998)67 final, p. 6 
 
Due to this reference to the OECD Model Tax Convention, the notion of interest is in-
tended to be similar to the notion used in Article 11 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. 
The notion of royalties 
For the purpose of the Interest and Royalty Directive, also the notion of royalty is defined 
directly in the directive. The wording in this regard is as follows:  
 
The term ‘royalties’ means payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use 
of, or the right to use, any copyright of literary, artistic or scientific work, including 
cinematograph films and software, any patent, trade mark, design or model, plan, secret 
formula or process, or for in-formation concerning industrial, commercial or scientific 
experience; payments for the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial or scien-
tific equipment shall be regarded as royalties.  
The Interest and Royalty Directive 
 
The quote specifies the notion of royalties for the purpose of the Directive. The use of the 
wording “the term ‘royalties’ means…” instead of, e.g., “An example of royalties are…” or 
“payments of any kind received as consideration for the use of, or the right to use for in-  ETS ALLOWANCES 
  62 
stance…” indicates that the notion of royalties under the Directive is exhaustive. In other 
words, it appears from the wording of the Interest and Royalties Directive that only the 
payments directly mentioned in the definition (typed in italic above) are covered by the 
scope of the Directive.  
 
The notion of royalties for the purpose of the directive is payments of any kind received as a 
consideration for the use of or the right to use the mentioned types of intellectual property. 
These mentioned types of intellectual property can in short be summarised as legal rights 
that primary follow from the protection of patents, trademarks, designs, copyrights or trade 
secrets etc. Thus, the mentioned rights are (mostly) legally protected, giving the owner the 
exclusive right to (cost-free) use and prevent others to use the intellectual property.  
 
In some Member States, EU allowances are most likely to qualify as intangible assets for cor-
porate income tax purposes, which follow from the comparative analysis carried out in our 
draft report on “Study on the Tax Treatment of EU Allowances - The Issues of Corporate 
Income Taxation”. Payments for the use of or the right to use EU allowances might qualify 
as royalties for national corporate tax law purposes if the allowances qualify as intangible as-
sets. 
 
Regardless of the qualification of ETS allowances, CDM’s or JI’s pursuant to national tax 
legislation, the practical transactions involving the EU allowances, CDM’s and JI’s are not of 
a similar nature as transactions involving intellectual property and the payment of royalties 
covered by the scope of the Directive. In our opinion, payments received as consideration for 
the use of or the right to use ETS allowances, CDM’s or JI’s are not covered by the notion 
of royalties and no basis for such an interpretation of the notion seems to exist. Conse-
quently, transactions under the ETS should not qualify as royalties for the purpose of the In-
terest and Royalty Directive. 
 
5.4.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a whole, we find little evidence that the current construct of EU national taxes and bilat-
eral OECD based bilateral tax treaties will lead to significant malfunctioning of the ETS sys-
tem. In particular, welfare losses from tax induced distortion to the location of abatement ac-
tivities will be absolute trivial compared to the massive levels of abatement the system will 
deliver and the overall yearly purchase costs of ETS allowances. 
 
However, the lack of clarity and transparency in terms of the treatment that Member States 
will apply to ETS allowances leads to unnecessary compliance costs. Auditing firms and 
firms with ETS compliance obligations spend time on guessing what explicit tax system will 
eventually emerge in countries that have not yet implemented specific tax provisions. More-
over, we noted some problems related to the tax treatment of the CDM and JI instruments. 
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The EU and its Member States have several possible options.   
 
The first and least complicated is to adopt a set of best practice rules for taxation, a code of 
essentially voluntary character. In our view, it could focus on a few key principles already 
outlined. Allowances both in terms of EUA´s and CER´s should be treated as a commodity 
in national tax law and purchase costs deducted against the tax bill when used for compli-
ance. Any gains or losses resulting from changes in the price of allowances should be taxed 
when they are realised, i.e. when sold. Accrual taxation is certainly possible but deviates from 
tax practice in Member States. The exception is financial institutions and professional trad-
ers where accrual taxation is the norm. We also suggest that taxation of free allowances is in-
cluded in the best practice guideline. We have a preference for the model where they are not 
taxed with the counterpart that they cannot be deducted when used.  In addition, it should 
be agreed in an appropriate OECD forum that ETS allowances in the context of bilateral 
treaties should be treated as business profits in line with the treatment as a commodity 
linked to firms ongoing production activities.   
 
Moreover, our analysis regarding CDM and JI´s showed that the most important issue is in-
consistent qualification and/or tax treatment of CDM/JI both in terms of cost incurred in 
the project phase, but also with respect to trade of secondary CER´s. The inconsistence may 
cause double non-taxation, double taxation and/or inefficiencies in terms of GHG abate-
ment. In order to provide for more harmonised and consistent treatment the Commission 
should push for guidelines on proper tax treatment to be developed and discussed as well in 
appropriate international forums.  These guidelines would provide the member states with 
the opportunity to harmonise rules and practises and, hence secure EU tax treatment that 
support the functioning of the market for GHG abatement and mitigate the opportunity for 
tax arbitrage. 
 
A second approach is to link a more co-ordinated approach to the taxation of ETS allow-
ances with the work to create a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base for businesses 
operating within the EU, abbreviated as CCCTB. The complexity for firms and authorities 
by having to operate in patchwork of 27 national tax systems entails tax uncertainty, double 
taxation as well as compliance costs that has led the Commission to initiate the work to-
wards creating a CCCTB. If adopted, the CCCTB will make it possible for businesses to opt 
for taxation according to one set of common rules instead of national rules. 
 
There are three problems associated with use of the CCCTB to solve the ETS taxation prob-
lem, which in our evaluation suggests that this is not a promising route. First, how to recog-
nise an asset for tax purposes is not completely clear under the CCCTB rules. Indeed, the 
qualification of the ETS allowances – as intangible assets, commodity, financials assets etc. – 
could in itself prove to be difficult. Second, potential benefits depend on whether businesses 
actually choose to opt for the CCCTB rules and whether a reasonable number of Member 
States decide to introduce the CCCTB rules. As a consequence, the introduction of the 
CCCTB would not necessarily entail that all companies/groups involved with the EU ETS   ETS ALLOWANCES 
  64 
would end up being taxed according to the CCCTB rules. Third, the near term probabilities 
of CCCTB being adopted and applied widely in the EU are not very high.  
 
A third approach or perhaps rather aspiration would be if the ETS allowance could be said 
to fall within EU’s directive on royalties and interests. We did not find evidence for risk of 
double taxation, but if transactions from trade of allowances falls under The Interest and 
Royalty Directive this may prevent double taxation. However, the conclusion in this review 
is that income derived from EU ETS allowances, CDM’s, or JI’s are not covered by the no-
tion of interests under the Directive as neither ETS allowances, nor CDM’s and JI’s qualify 
as debt claims. Furthermore, it is submitted that payments for the use of – or the right to use 
– ETS allowances, CDM’s, or JI’s are not covered by the notion of royalties for the purpose 
of the Directive. 
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DESIGN OF MODELLING SETUP OF NON-UNIFORM TAXATION OF ETS ALLOWANCES 
In the following, we demonstrate how the additional abatement cost figures from Table 4.8 
above have been calculated. First, we theoretically explain how the distortion arises. Second, 
we demonstrate how we have aggregated tax regimes into comparable measures that are sen-
sible to use in an economic model of abatement costs. Third, we describe the content of the 
economic model. Fourth, we present scenario and robustness analyses. 
The economic issue 
The Eu-wide market for carbon emission allowances, the ETS, is intended to facilitate the 
cheapest and most efficient carbon emission abatement for a given level of maximum pollu-
tion. For the efficiency result to hold, we need a common net allowance price across Eu-
countries. Firms across Europe should have exactly the same incentive to cut on emissions. 
However, differences in taxation schemes may cause differences in net prices. This will lead 
to an inefficient allocation of allowances where cheap abatement in a high-tax country is 
substituted by expensive abatement in a low-tax country. 
 
In the figure below, we demonstrate the welfare loss of non-uniform taxation. Each panel 
represents a small open economy – in the left panel taxation is more lax than the European 
average and in the right panel taxation is more rigid. This implies that industries in the left 
panel Member State will perceive marginal abatement costs below their actual (comparable) 
level. The opposite holds for the right panel industries. Thus, at the given allowance price, 
p*, industries in the left panel Member State choose to over-abate, while industries in the 
right panel choose to over-emit, and this creates welfare losses of the size illustrated by the 
shaded triangles. The situation of a large open economy influencing the allowance price is 
slightly more complicated to represent in a single figure, but the mechanisms are basically 
the same. 
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Figure 0.1 Welfare losses from non-uniform taxation 
 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics 
 
The purpose of the empirical model is to assess the absolute magnitude of the problem at the 
EU level under current taxation schemes. That is, we will seek to measure the accumulated 
size of triangles across Member States. 
 
We can use this graphic framework to see why the overall distortion losses are minor in 
magnitude. Consider Figure 0.2, showing the actual and perceived marginal abatement costs 
for Germany – the largest abater - and holding one of the more extreme tax equivalents of 
around -2 pct, c.f. Figure 0.4 below. Yet, the perturbation in marginal abatement costs from 
differential tax treatment is rather limited – the eye can hardly capture the difference be-
tween the two lines. Our model tells us that Germany should abate app. 24.83 million ton-
nes C, but the perturbation causes an actual abatement of app. 25.15 million tonnes C.
33 
The additional (avoidable) abatement costs amounts to app. 0.09 million €, which is again 
an extremely small figure. Another way of acknowledging the limited size of the triangle is to 
note that abatement is app. 1per cent higher than first-best (25.15/24.83-1=1.2 per cent) 
and this happens at a cost perceived app. 2 per cent below the actual. This amounts to app. 
1 per cent * 2 per cent / 2 = 0.01 per cent. 
 
                                                        
33 The model counts abatement in carbon units, not CO2 units. The conversion factor is app. 12/44 and this has 
been applied to the vertical axis of the figure to obtain a standard CO2 allowance price. 
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Figure 0.2: Perceived and actual MAC’s for Germany, 20 pct reduction scenario 
 
Note: Marginal abatement costs curve for Germany as calibrated in the model. 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics 
 
Aggregating tax regimes to tax equivalents 
One of the main challenges in the empirical modelling is to quantify the impact from a 
given tax regime. In terms of Figure 0.1 and Figure 0.2, what we need to understand is how 
much the perceived abatement costs tilt away from the actual abatement costs on a country 
by country basis. Technically, what we aim at is a comparable measure of the angle between 
the two curves, a tax equivalent, capturing the differences in tax regimes. A high tax equiva-
lent corresponds to a relatively unfavourable tax regime and vice versa. 
 
In order to answer the question of how to quantify tax regimes, we first need to identify 
what general regimes apply throughout the EU. Since there are two types of allowances, 
grandfathered and auctioned, we need to separate the identification according to these. Our 
conclusions concerning tax regimes are the following: 
 
  Grandfathered: 
o  Allowances are treated under a separate heading on the balance sheet. Al-
lowances will never enter the profit-loss account and therefore not create 
any tax effects. 
o  Allowances are treated as income in the year of grandfathering. Used al-
lowances will then figure as an expense. Thus, tax effects will only arise to 
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  Auctioned
34: 
o  Allowances are considered a business expense in the year of purchase 
o  Allowances are considered an intangible asset, which is to be depreciated 
when used. Alternatively, allowances are considered a business expense in 
the year of use. 
o  Allowances are considered an intangible asset, which is to be depreciated 
linearly (and when used correcting for base) 
 
In several countries there is uncertainty towards the applicable regime as several solutions can 
be equally valid, i.e., it is basically an accounting choice. Other countries have slightly differ-
ent wording on the classification of auctioned allowances, but essentially all countries fall 
within either of the three mentioned categories from a practical, economic point of view (an-
swering the question: when is what deductable from earned profits?). The complete list of 
country regimes is provided in Table 0.1. Apart from listing corporate tax rates, the table 
shows the applicable rules on a country by country basis. In cases, where several tax regimes 
may be applicable, we have answered ‘yes’ to the most favourable regime seen from a net pre-
sent tax value perspective. This corresponds to accountants behaving economically rational.
35  
 
                                                        
34 According to the inquiry by Deloitte, Portugal does not allow any deductions or depreciation of expenses. This 
regime is not presented on the list. 
35 In reality, firms may have other considerations than just maximizing net present tax values for ETS allowances.   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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AUT  0.250  no  no  NA  yes  0.125 
BEL  0.340  no  yes  immediate  no  NA 
DEU  0.298  no  yes  immediate  no  NA 
DNK  0.250  no  yes  time of use  no  NA 
ESP  0.300  yes  no  NA  yes  0.1 
FIN  0.260  no  no  NA  yes  0.1 
FRA  0.344  no  yes  immediate  no  NA 
GBR  0.280  yes  yes  time of use  no  NA 
GRC  0.250  yes  yes  immediate  no  NA 
IRL  0.125  no  yes  immediate  no  NA 
ITA  0.314  no  yes  time of use  no  NA 
LUX  0.286  no  yes  immediate  no  NA 
NLD  0.255  no  yes  immediate  no  NA 
PRT  0.265  no  no  NA  no  NA 
SWE  0.263  no  yes  time of use  no  NA 
HUN  0.213  no  no  NA  yes  0.125 
POL  0.190  no  yes  time of use  no  NA 
CYP  0.100  no  yes  time of use  no  NA 
CZE  0.200  no  yes  time of use  no  NA 
MLT  0.350  no  yes  immediate  no  NA 
SVK  0.190  no  yes  time of use  no  NA 
SVN  0.210  no  yes  time of use  no  NA 
EST  0.210  no  yes  immediate  no  NA 
LVA  0.150  no  yes  time of use  no  NA 
LTU  0.200  no  yes  time of use  no  NA 
BGR  0.100  no  no  NA  yes  0.15 
ROM  0.160  no  yes  time of use  no  NA 
Source:  Deloitte and EU Commission tax survey from 2009 
 
To focus the analysis on the pure tax effects, we consider the ETS Phase III (2013-2020) 
with a constant allowance price, since a non-constant price would only blur intuition. 
Moreover, we assume that firms have a strong desire to possess their necessary allowances for 
the entire period as soon as possible (in order to make valid investment decisions and other 
long term planning.)
36 In this way, we can consider differences in the net present value of 
                                                        
36 Technically, we assume that this desire is stronger than the potential negative cash-flow effects related to purchase 
of all allowances at the beginning of the phase III period.   ETS ALLOWANCES 
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purchasing the necessary allowances as soon as possible when focusing only on the auctioned 
allowances (we discuss grandfathering below). 
 
In Figure 0.3 we assume that a firm needs 100 allowances throughout the period 2013-
2020, and it is able to buy all these at the beginning for a price of, say, 20 €/tCO2. This 
amounts to an immediate expense of 2000 €. This amount can now be deducted through 
the profit-loss account at various points in time and various sizes depending on the tax re-
gime. 
 
Figure 0.3 Tax regimes and corresponding deductions/depreciations 
 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics 
 
In the simplest and most favourable regime, the company deducts immediately and gain the 
highest possible tax value. If the corporate tax rate is 25 per cent, the 2000 € expense would 
contribute with 500 € tax savings and therefore a firm net present compliance cost of 1500 
€. We observe this regime as the single bar reaching 500 € in 2013. 
 
The equally simple, but less favourable, regime concerns depreciation at time of use. This 
amounts to depreciating 250 € per year during all eight years (assuming identical annual 
emissions) contributing with 250 € * 0.25=62.5 € in tax savings each year. We find this 
amount illustrated by the equal sized bars in the figure. Using a discount factor of 5 per cent, 
this method gives rise to a net present tax value of app. 424 €, thus an experienced compli-
ance cost of 1576 €. 
 
The last regime combines linear depreciation and depreciation from base (of intangible as-
sets) when used. Thus, in the first period the firm will depreciate all used allowances and a 
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lustrated by the deep green bars in the figure. The net present value amounts to app. 447 
with same discount factor as above yielding compliance costs of 1553 €. 
 
The experienced compliance costs in the three regimes were 1500 €, 1576 €, and 1553 €. 
Taking the first regime as reference this implies tax equivalents of 5.1 per cent and 3.5 per 
cent, respectively. This is, however, only applicable for auctioned allowances. 
 
Turning to the grandfathered allowances, the basic issue is in fact quite similar as it centres 
around net present value effects. There are two regimes: in one regime (used by most coun-
tries) grandfathered allowances only enter (and exit) the balance sheet without any tax ef-
fects; in the other regime grandfathered allowances enter the profit-loss account as income 
when granted and expense when used. This would basically also imply a zero tax effect if all 
granted allowances are used in a given year. Drawing on historical data from the ETS com-
pliance database, CITL, we see that storage of allowances between periods is not that wide-
spread. In 2008, we experienced negative storage (emitters have drawn on previous stocks 
and/or have paid penalty for non-compliance), while the crisis year 2009 resulted in storage 
of 9 per cent, c.f. Table 0.2. 
 
Table 0.2 Allocated and verified emissions, millions  
Million tonnes  2008  2009  Total 2008-2009 
Allocated emissions  1,956  1,967  3923 
Surrendered CERs  82  78  160 
Surrendered ERUs  0  3  3 
Total allowances  2039  2048  4086 
Verified emissions  2119  1873  3993 
Surplus  -81  174  94 
Surplus (pct)  -4 %  9 %  2 % 
Source:  CITL 
 
Thus, for the 5-10 per cent of allocated allowances which have been stored, firms located in 
countries with the income-tax-regime face a disadvantage in terms of negative net present tax 
value. A similar drawing as above could be made, but we hope the mechanism is clear by 
now. We emphasise that since the tax effect only concerns a small (and probably decreasing 
fraction) of grandfathered allowances together with the fact that it is only the net present 
value aspect giving rise to differences, the overall effect will be very limited. 
 
Now, summarising the differences in tax regimes and calculating the corresponding tax 
equivalents, we get the picture drawn in Figure 0.4. We emphasise that the tax equivalents 
are calculated on the basis of an EU-wide corporate tax rate of 23.5 per cent.
37 In this way, 
we focus the analysis entirely on the differential treatment of allowances, not on other differ-
ences in tax systems. Apart from Portugal – characterised by no possibility to depreciate or 
deduct – most countries lie within a quite narrow band. The figure shows that a country like 
                                                        
37 EC (2009).   ETS ALLOWANCES 
  75 
Ireland (the first bar from above) perceives abatement costs 2 per cent lower than a hypo-
thetical European average. The formulas for calculation of tax equivalents are presented be-
low in the model description. 
 
Figure 0.4 Tax equivalents 
 
Source:  Copenhagen Economics 
 
The abatement cost model 
We build an empirical simulation model around the abatement curves of EU Member 
States. The model considers the efficiency level of applying different country-level carbon 
taxes (or tax equivalents). 
 
The model first constructs country level CO2 (marginal) abatement curves. The starting 
point for the construction of abatement curves are polynomials found in the economic litera-
ture.
38 These are then adjusted (after proper inclusion of the CDM market, see below) to the 
cost and market predictions of OECD and European Commission studies.
39 
  
In addition to abatement cost curves, we just need to put in the desired emission reduction 
targets and the tax equivalents from above. Keeping the focus on ETS Phase III gives rise to 
natural reduction targets of either 20 per cent by 2020 or the proposed 30 per cent target. 
 
The abatement cost model has been augmented by a CDM module. The CDM module in-
corporates the fact that CDM’s may be an equivalent source to abatement and treated simi-
larly to allowances. Calibration of the CDM offer curve is based on another recent academic 
                                                        
38 Böhringer et al (2008) 
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study analysing the likely shape of this curve.
40 In the CDM module we incorporate the fact 
that only 20 per cent of total abatement is allowed from CDM under current proposals for 
legislation. 
 
To calculate the total welfare loss, we simply need to run the model with and without non-
uniform taxation rules. The difference in abatement costs will exactly measure the welfare 
loss associated with non-uniform taxation across countries. In the following, we provide a 
more rigorous documentation of the model. 
 
The basics of the model is completely similar to Böhringer et al (2008), who consider the ef-
ficiency level of applying different country-level carbon taxes for sectors covered by the ETS. 
In essence, the economic mechanisms at work are exactly the same in our and their study. 
 
The model first constructs country level CO2 (marginal) abatement curves. The starting 
point for the construction of abatement curves is the polynomials from the above mentioned 
article. These are then calibrated (after proper inclusion of the CDM market, see below) to 
the cost and market predictions of OECD and Commission studies.
41 If we denote the pa-
rameters of the Böhringer abatement cost polynomials as a1i, a2i, and a3i and our calibration 
constant as μ, we can write the marginal abatement curves as: 
 